


29 March 1993



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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Proliferation Issues**



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# PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-93-009

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29 March 1993

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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## SOUTH AFRICA

### De Klerk Discloses Nuclear Capability to Parliament

*MB2403161093 Johannesburg Radio South Africa  
Network in English 1448 GMT 24 Mar 93*

[Address by President F.W. de Klerk to a special joint session of Parliament in Cape Town; italicized passages in Afrikaans—live; broadcast in progress]

[Text] ... Nonproliferation Treaty and related matters. Since then certain developments have compelled me to cover a wider area. I am, however, still commencing with announcements relating to South Africa's nuclear capability. Honorable members will recall that when I delivered my first opening address on 2 February 1990 I emphasized, among other things, the normalization of South Africa's international relations. An important aspect of this was, and is, the significant contribution that South Africa can and will have to make toward peace, stability and progress in southern Africa. With this objective in mind the government has, in addition to many other initiatives in a variety of other spheres, taken far-reaching and drastic decisions with regard to the nonproliferation of all weapons of mass destruction. This includes nuclear as well as chemical and biological weapons.

The government acceded to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the NPT, on 10 July 1991. We became a founder signatory of the United Nations Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, and on their destruction on 14 January 1993. It is also participating in the current review of the Convention on Biological and Toxic Weapons.

I wish to concentrate today on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and would like to convey important information to Parliament, the public and the international community. It is important that the integrity of the Republic of South Africa with regard to its commitments to nuclear nonproliferation should be placed above any doubt.

When a country accedes to the NPT it undertakes, as from the date of accession, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. It also undertakes to enter into a safeguards agreement in terms of which a comprehensive inventory of all the nuclear material and nuclear facilities as they exist for the country as a whole at the time that agreement enters into force, be submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. Such facilities and material are then subject to international inspection and verification. The IAEA also conducts regular inspections to verify the inventory and to ensure that these materials and facilities are used for peaceful purposes only.

Since its accession to the NPT, South Africa has strictly adhered to the conditions of the NPT and has maintained a policy of transparency and professional cooperation with the IAEA. This positive approach has led to South Africa's resuming its seat at the IAEA general

assembly since September 1991, without opposition, after an absence of 12 years. The process of verifying the completeness of South Africa's declaration of nuclear materials and facilities has proceeded so successfully that the IAEA was in the position to report to the Board of Governors in September 1992, after a large number of IAEA inspections, that nothing had been found to suggest that South Africa's inventory of nuclear materials and facilities was not complete, nor was there anything to suggest that the list of facilities and materials submitted for control were incomplete.

However, mainly because of the events in Iraq, which violated the conditions of the NPT by launching a clandestine nuclear weapons program, certain countries have called the effectiveness of the IAEA Verification Regime into question. Some countries have also alleged that South Africa still has covert aspirations in this regard, and that it has not fully disclosed its stockpile of enriched uranium. Such allegations are regularly taken up by both the local and the international press, and are beginning to take on the dimensions of a campaign.

South Africa's present nuclear program which is directed towards commercialization, including the export of high-technology products, is in the process placed under suspicion and is harmed. Our country cannot afford this. Accordingly, I wish today to confirm unequivocally that South Africa is adhering strictly to the requirements of the NPT and that it will continue to do so. I would, however, like to go further. Any doubt about the government's intention with regard to nuclear matters must for once and for all be removed. For this reason the government has decided to provide full information on South Africa's past nuclear programs despite the fact that the NPT does not require this.

At one stage South Africa did indeed develop a limited nuclear deterrent capability. The decision to develop this limited capability was taken as early as 1974 against the background of a Soviet expansionist threat to southern Africa as well as prevailing uncertainty concerning the designs of the Warsaw Pact members. The buildup of the Cuban forces in Angola from 1975 onwards reinforced the perception that a deterrent was necessary as did South Africa's relative international isolation and the fact that it could not rely on outside assistance should it be attacked.

Details relating to the limited deterrent capabilities and the strategy in this regard which were at the time developed, are as follows: The objective was the provision of seven nuclear fission devices which was considered the minimum for testing purposes and for the maintenance, thereafter, of a credible deterrent capability. When the decision was taken to terminate the program only six devices had been completed. No advanced nuclear explosives, such as thermo-nuclear explosives, were manufactured. The program was under the direct control of the head of government who decided that it should be managed and implemented by Armscor [Armaments Corporation of South Africa].

Knowledge of the existence of the program was limited to a number of ministers on a need to know basis. The strategy was that if the situation in southern Africa were to deteriorate seriously, a confidential indication of the deterrent capability would be given to one or more of the major powers, for example the United States, in an attempt to persuade them to intervene. It was never the intention to use the devices and from the outset the emphasis was on deterrence. This was the situation when I became state president in 1989. As a former minister of the AEC [Atomic Energy Corporation] I was also informed about this. On my assumption of office as state president it was already evident to me and also to my colleagues who were also informed, that it was in our national interest that a total reverse, also in respect of our nuclear policy, was called for.

During 1989 the global political situation changed dramatically. A cease-fire in Angola was agreed. On the 22 September 1988, a tripartite agreement was signed at the United Nations, with Cuba and Angola, which provided for the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola. The cold war had come to an end and developments leading to the destruction of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the Soviet Bloc had become the order of the day. The prospect of moving away from a confrontational relationship with the international community in general and with our neighbors in Africa, in particular, to one of cooperation and developments were good. In these circumstances a nuclear deterrent had become, not only superfluous but in fact an obstacle to the development of South Africa's international relations.

World opinion had also become increasingly opposed to nuclear weapons and significant advantages for South Africa could be forthcoming should it accede to the NPT. Although it already had an advanced nuclear technology base and nuclear industry, accession would facilitate the international exchanges of the new technology for its future development. It could also be of benefit to our neighboring states and in due course to Africa as a whole. Within this factual framework and with consideration to all of the other innovative policy objectives, which by then had already begun to take form, it was decided towards the end of 1989 that the pilot enrichment plant at Pelindaba should be closed and decommissioned.

Early in 1990, final effect was given to decisions that all the nuclear devices should be dismantled and destroyed. All the nuclear material in Armscor's possession should be recast and returned to the AEC where it should be stored according to internationally accepted measures. Armscor's facility should be decontaminated and be used only for nonnuclear commercial purposes, after which South Africa should accede to the Nonproliferation Treaty, thereby submitting all its nuclear materials and facilities to internal safeguards.

The implementation of these decisions and instructions proceeded according to plan. The process of dismantling took place under the strict joint control of the AEC and Armscor. As a further control measure, an eminent professor of nuclear physics, Professor W.L. Mouton,

was appointed as independent auditor to oversee the process and to report directly to me. It was his task to satisfy himself that every gram of nuclear material had been accounted for, and that all the hardware and design information was destroyed. This has been done. South Africa acceded to the Nonproliferation Treaty on the 10th of July 1991, and signed, according to the requirements of the treaty, a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA on the 16th of September 1991 with immediate force and effect. On the 30th of October 1991, in accordance with the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, South Africa submitted a complete inventory of all nuclear materials and facilities under its jurisdiction, which contains such materials on the 30th of September 1991, since which date all such materials and facilities are subject to international safeguards.

South Africa's hands are clean and we are concealing nothing. Permission has now been granted by the government with a view to international inspection for full access to the facilities and the records of facilities which in the past were used for the preparation of a nuclear deterrent capability.

I sincerely trust, Mr. Speaker, that this unprecedented act, namely the voluntary dismantling of a nuclear deterrent capability, and the voluntary revelation of all relevant information, will confirm this government's effort to assure transparency. I trust also that South Africa's initiative will inspire other countries to take the same steps.

In conclusion Mr. Speaker, on this issue, I wish to emphasize that at no time did South Africa acquire nuclear weapons technology or materials from another country, nor has it provided any to any other country, or cooperated with another country in this regard. Our expertise, technology and nuclear materials were fully protected and dealt with strictly according to international standards and agreements. South Africa has never conducted a clandestine nuclear test. There may be a perception that the decision to abandon the program means that the investment in the whole enterprise had been wasted. This is not the case. The enrichment technology developed by the AEC, as well as the nuclear materials which were produced, constitute an important asset for South Africa. They will contribute significantly to the ultimate success of the Atomic Energy Corporation's peaceful commercialization program.

The operation of the Pilot Enrichment Plant allowed South Africa to continue operation of the AEC's research reactor, which is also used for the production of radioactive isotopes for medical purposes, during a period when the international community refused to provide nuclear fuel for its operation. The nuclear material that was used for the devices has been recovered and will be used to enlarge the production of these and other isotopes. Safari 1 is amongst the very few reactors in the world which can meet this need.

Furthermore, the application of the enrichment technology to the establishment of the semi-commercial enrichment plant provided South Africa with the ability to provide all the nuclear fuel requirements of the Koeberg Nuclear power station and to guarantee this supply at a time when the delivery of nuclear fuel for Koeberg from overseas was denied. In addition to this, South Africa's accession to the NPT has already led to the lifting of nuclear sanctions by the United States of America. Exchanges of visits with states in Africa have also taken place with a view to agreements on the use of medical isotopes and training programs. We have become a member of the Africa Regional Cooperative Agreement, ARCA, an organization within the IAEA, which coordinates peaceful nuclear projects and cooperation between African states in the nuclear field. The prospects for further cooperation will be enhanced by the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone in Africa. The government has already publicly committed itself to this and believes that it can make a significant contribution to the establishment of peace and security in southern Africa.

South Africa will soon be taking an active part in the transcontinental discussions on this all important issue. We will be supported by the fact that South Africa acquired a nuclear capability and in recognition of its new relationship with Africa and the broader international community, abandoned it. Without accession to the NPT none of this would have been possible. I trust that the book on this chapter of the past can now be closed and that a new one of international cooperation and trust can now be opened.

*Mr. Speaker, in this regard, before I discuss violence and negotiation, I want to deviate from my prepared speech in the light of the reaction from the benches of the Conservative Party. Sir, from their tone and interjections I deduce that they would like South Africa to still have an atom bomb at its disposal, and Sir, it is their approach that if they were ever ... if they were ever in power, then they would use such a bomb against other people ...*

*[Speaker, interrupting] Order, the honorable Mr. Hercules ...*

*[De Klerk continues] Sir, if there was ever a reason for this country to finally lose all trust in that party then it is because of their attitude today on this issue. [shouting from floor]*

*[Speaker, interrupting] Order ... order ... order ...*

*[De Klerk continues] Sir, I want to address violence and negotiations. While the future of our country's international relations seems to be rosy, the same cannot be said about the internal situation. I do not want to imply that there has not been several positive and encouraging developments taking place in South Africa. We have a lot to be thankful for.*

*Unfortunately, these positive factors, which include the resumption of multiparty negotiations, because it is very positive, is being dominated by a continuing wave of crime and violence. This was worsened by the recent series*

*of revolting and senseless murders of children and travelers, especially in Natal and Transvaal. Rightly so, this has unleashed a feeling of deep resentment, shock and anger among most South Africans. The same goes for the international community.*

*Mr. Speaker, without ignoring the seriousness and tragic consequences of all other killings through political violence, we call to memory the following: The tragic death of six schoolchildren and the wounding of a seventh in the Table Mountain area near Pietermaritzburg at the beginning of March 1993, where innocent children were ambushed and murdered on their way to school; the similar cold-blooded attack on 19 March 1993 at Eikenhof near Johannesburg, during which two children and their mother were shot dead; the so-called retaliatory attacks, in which a child in Nigel was cold-bloodedly wounded and in which a black man died in a similar incident. Add to this several other incidents, including the incident in which 10 children were also shot dead in an attack on a minibus taxi in the Table Mountain area in Natal and the attack on a bus on the way to Pietermaritzburg in which four children were killed—then the extent and the seriousness of the situation will become still clearer. Our deepest sympathy and compassion goes out to the families of all those who died in violence and, in particular, to the families of the innocent children who were so brutally murdered. There is no excuse in this world that can be given for these murders. It is barbaric and totally unacceptable in civilized society.*

*An analysis of these incidents, Mr. Speaker, brings two other aspects to the fore. Firstly, it emphasizes the potential polarization between the various population groups in our country. Secondly, circumstances indicate that several militant organizations are most probably responsible for this. In truth, APLA [Azanian People's Liberation Army] stands out as a result of reported acceptance of responsibility for a whole series of terrorist attacks and as a result of the arrogant way in which it continues to promote political violence. The fact is, however, that some of these children were also murdered by members of other militant political organizations.*

*Another aspect that comes to the fore is that certain political spokesmen and commentators are accusing the government of having a double agenda and that the government reacts quicker in cases of murders of white people and children, compared to their reaction to the murders of children of black people. I reject this insinuation and accusation. The police act in every case, using the same criteria, determining what action to take. In the case of murders of black children in Natal, the police acted effectively and strongly and they were successful in apprehending the murderers. The deployment of security forces to counter political violence and the emphasis on protection and security in areas mainly inhabited by black South Africans, indicate the falseness of this insinuation. Allegations of this nature, sir, is fuel for all those who want to heighten racial tension, and it is used by radicals and those advocating violence. We must guard against a new*

*spiral of violence at all costs—against the belief that violence can be countered by further violence.*

*Mr. Speaker, after saying this, I want to emphasize that the public statements of the PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress], and its military wing, APLA, truly demand special attention. The PAC cannot disregard its direct link between itself and APLA. Its own declarations regarding the matter is proof of this link. All information at the government's disposal shows a direct relationship between the leadership of the PAC and APLA, and we hold the PAC responsible for all the activities of APLA. PAC's refusal to distance itself from APLA statements and actions, and its dualistic approach to a peaceful process, and also its refusal to sign the Peace Accord, creates a serious obstacle in the multiparty negotiations process. The same applies to other participants who have not signed the Peace Accord. It is therefore, the government's opinion that it has now become necessary for multiparty negotiations to focus on ending the violence. All participants must be bound and committed to the peace process. Military wings, private armies, and militant sub-organizations must be effectively and visibly bound to ending all illegal activities. The government is not planning to disrupt the negotiations process, but will insist that these matters be solved peacefully. No party can faithfully be part of peaceful negotiations, while organizations under its control continue with violent activities and contravening the law with its silent approval.*

Mr. Speaker, current circumstances, also demand that steps be taken in other areas, and not only in the area of negotiations. The most important being the intensifying of police and security force actions. From my announcements during the opening of Parliament, quite a few measures in this matter are already in operation, and are contained in a 10-point plan, which the South African Police will make known within a few days.

In addition, I want to announce that during the past 24 hours, 18 identified members of APLA were arrested, and are being held for questioning. More arrests are to follow. I also want to announce that, [disruptions from the floor], Mr. Speaker, I also want to announce that the government has decided on a comprehensive action plan for the stabilization of all areas in the country which are identified as problem areas. Because a surprise element is important, if one wants to obtain success, full details cannot be made known. The implementation of this plan will demand that security forces drastically increase their manpower efforts for a time. Consequently, the defense force will be able to send urgent messages over a fairly wide region.

Sir, with these envisaged security actions, the government also considers the application of punishment in the struggle against violence and crime. In this regard, the death penalty is an important subject. I have already indicated at the opening of Parliament on 29 January 1993, that the government is in the process of reevaluating its position on the death penalty. The government is convinced that the present policy to retain the death

penalty is both morally and legally correct, and gives an honest view of the state's duty to protect the interest of its citizens. The government also believes that these preventative mechanisms should be included in a charter of fundamental rights. The death penalty in line with constitutional policy, as proposed by the South African Law Commission, is a legitimate option, and should be considered.

*Sir, In light of the progress made with regard to the acceptance of a charter of fundamental rights, the government found it necessary and fair to suspend the execution of the death penalty for a reasonable period, pending the outcome of the negotiations process over a transition charter of fundamental rights, which will apply during this phase. During the opening of Parliament on 29 January 1993, I indicated that the wave of brutal murders and killings, the prevailing disrespect for human lives, the delays in the negotiations process, makes it very difficult for the government to let this moratorium continue indefinitely. That is why it was announced that the government is reconsidering its position on the execution of the death penalty, and will consult with Parliament on this matter. Mr. Speaker, the government has decided to approach Parliament at the first possible opportunity, during a motion in Parliament, to give an opportunity to all members to vote on this matter during a debate. At the same time, In my capacity as leader of the National Party, I would like to announce that all members of the National Party will be allowed to vote on such a matter freely, according to each person's individual conviction.*

*At the same time the government will launch an intensive process of consultation with leaders of extra-Parliamentary parties and organizations. In conclusion, sir, I want to get back to the issue of APLA. Today a report was released by the Commission of Inquiry Into the Causes and Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, better known as the Goldstone Commission—released by a committee appointed by the commission, who conducted a preliminary investigation into the activities of APLA. I do not want to go into the details of the report. In general, the government accepts the recommendations in the report.*

*Concerning the Transkei, the committee has made the following preliminary findings, and I quote: APLA is using Transkei as a springboard for attacks into the Republic of South Africa. Weapons and ammunition are being hidden in Transkei for use by APLA units. The presence of APLA members in the Transkei is known to members of the Transkei Police. The Transkeian government has supplied weapons to APLA, allegedly for VIP protection programs. APLA members are being trained in Transkei. Weapons and explosives are being smuggled into the Republic of South Africa and Transkei, for use by APLA members. APLA's internal high command for the Republic is based in Transkei. Sir, as the honorable members know, the Goldstone Commission committee has repeatedly extended public invitations to all parties to submit important information. In the light of serious allegations, concerning the involvement of, among others,*

*official Transkeian institutions, with regard to APLA activities, the committee chairman specifically directed a request to the Transkei government to participate in its activities. The Transkei government, after several requests, neglected to take part.*

*Mr. Speaker, the preliminary findings of this committee, indicating active participation by official Transkeian institutions in APLA activities in South Africa, is cause for serious concern. The government of the Republic of South Africa views this in an extremely serious light. It has been decided to urgently request the Transkei government's reaction to the report, as proposed by the commission. It must be emphasized that it is not just the South African Government which desires reaction from the Transkei government, but the commission itself. Action taken by the government will depend on the reaction from the Transkei government.*

*Sir, in conclusion I want to ask that we, the highest council in the country, stand back a while and review at the situation in the country. Everything, sir ... everything is positive ... organized, poised for progress—for a breakthrough to a negotiated new dispensation in South Africa. Multiparty negotiations, sir, on an extended basis have been resumed. Under the most important economic circumstances a budget has been tabled which has instilled confidence in investors. Sir, we have had good rains and agriculture stands on the threshold of yielding a better harvest compared to many years. Sir, there are many positive things which can lead to peace and prosperity for all if we act responsibly now. But sir, there is one thing standing between us and that breakthrough and that Mr. Speaker, is the continued political violence, and it has become time that this must become the priority of each and every political leader. Sir, instead of some political parties—already structuring their own mobilization—thus contributing to the tension in our country, all political leaders, sir, should now come forth and identify this as the highest priority and stand together in bringing political violence to an end. Sir, if we do that there will remain a small lunatic fringe to the left and to the right who will try to continue with this, but all South Africans, sir, can and should be unified into one mighty (?wave), one strong unbreakable wall against the threat of violence. Sir, it is within our grasp, and I call from this podium to all South African leaders to accept the responsibility. Sir, the government will do its full share in bringing political violence to an end now. I thank you sir.*

#### **Waldo Stumpf, Pik Botha Interviewed**

MB2603112893 Johannesburg SABC TV 1 Network  
in Afrikaans 1830 GMT 24 Mar 93

[Interview with Atomic Energy Corporation Chief Executive Waldo Stumpf and South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha in the Cape Town parliamentary studio by South African Broadcasting Corporation reporter Freek Robinson on the "Agenda" program—live]

[Text] [Robinson] As we have just heard in the news, the announcement and the news of the day was State President F. W. de Klerk's announcement that South Africa did in fact manufacture its own nuclear weapons. To hear more about this, we now talk to Foreign Affairs Minister Pik Botha and the chief executive officer of the Atomic Energy Corporation [AEC], Dr. Waldo Stumpf, in our parliamentary studio in Cape Town. Good evening to you.

[Botha and Stumpf] Good evening.

[Robinson] Can you both hear me well?

[Botha and Stumpf] Very well, thank you.

[Robinson] I will start with you, Dr. Stumpf. I think we first of all want particulars on the actual nature of these nuclear weapons—if we can call them that—which South Africa had. First, when exactly was this campaign started?

[Stumpf] The program was initiated in 1974, but took several years before it came to a point when the first devise could be manufactured.

[Robinson] Approximately when was this done?

[Stumpf] It was toward the end of the 70's, the early 80's that we saw the first devise ready.

[Robinson] Would you say more or less 1980?

[Stumpf] Approximately that time.

[Robinson] You say a devise. What devise was this?

[Stumpf] You must realize that the strategy was never to use the weapons. Consequently, these were just devises and not weapons in the true sense of the word.

[Robinson] Now what is the difference between a weapon and a devise?

[Stumpf] A devise would typically be a devise which one would only use for purposes of demonstrations and which would not be used for offensive purposes.

[Robinson] Then why should one keep it?

[Stumpf] It was a deterrent, something you will have to ask Mr. Botha about.

[Robinson] But if it was only a demonstration model, how could it then be a deterrent?

[Stumpf] In the sense that it could in fact be a deterrent, the world would speculate about whether or not we had the ability.

[Robinson] The ability to make it?

[Stumpf] That is correct.

[Robinson] But do you want to say that we have never really had an atom bomb?

[Stumpf] No. One can indeed say that should a situation have arisen, we would have switched it over, but that was fortunately never the strategy.

[Robinson] So it has never ever been in a form that it could be used as an atom bomb?

[Stumpf] Not really.

[Robinson] In what form was it then?

[Stumpf] That information we do not really want to disclose. You know, under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, a country undertakes not to manufacture nuclear weapons, purchase, or even dispense of technology, so I think in the interest of nonproliferation we do not want to disclose technical information.

[Robinson] I could take it that you are afraid to give us that information, but I would very much like to know, if those devices could have been used, in what forms would they have been used?

[Stumpf] They could only then have been used in an underground test as a demonstration that South Africa does have the capability.

[Robinson] Has it ever been done?

[Stumpf] No, it was never done.

[Robinson] Neither underground nor at sea?

[Stumpf] No, not at all.

[Robinson] Are you aware that the Americans have said it was done?

[Stumpf] Well, I am aware of that, but if we could refer to that incident in the Atlantic, when President Carter even appointed experts to investigate the matter, and finally came to the conclusion that it was a micro-meteor which struck the satellite, and there was no nuclear weapon. There was in any case no waste material detected in the southern Atlantic Ocean. South Africa was in no way involved.

[Robinson] If such a devise could be used, how would it be used, say for instance in missile firing, or with an aircraft, or how?

[Stumpf] I think, theoretically, this devise could have been fired from an aircraft or a missile, but it was fortunately never the strategy, and it was also not necessary.

[Robinson] About how many were built? Six at this...

[Stumpf, interrupting] There was permission for seven, but when the program was terminated, there were six completed.

[Robinson] Was the seventh under construction?

[Stumpf] Yes, it was being manufactured.

[Robinson] When was the decision taken to terminate it?

[Stumpf] The decision was taken late in 1989 in principle, and was confirmed very early in 1990 under the present state president.

[Robinson] When was it in reality dismantled?

[Stumpf] The dismantling started early in 1990, February, March, when the launching installation at Phelendaba were closed. The dismantling was preceded by comprehensive procedures which had been drawn up. As you also know, an auditor was appointed, Professor Wynand Mouton, who audited the whole dismantling process.

[Robinson] That started in 1990, you say. When was it completed?

[Stumpf] It was completed in July 1991, just before we signed the proliferation treaty on 10 July 1991.

[Robinson] All six were completely dismantled at that time. In other words, during a period of about a year?

[Stumpf] That is correct. All six. The material was remelted and returned for storage, the hardware was dismantled and destroyed, and the drawings were also destroyed.

[Robinson] What happened to the uranium?

[Stumpf] The uranium is presently with the AEC, and being stored under full international...

[Robinson] Sorry for interrupting, what is AEC?

[Stumpf] The Atomic Energy Corporation. The uranium is presently with the Atomic Energy Corporation where it is being stored under full international control. Everything has been declared to the AEC, is under their inspection, the seals are in their vaults, the cameras, and so on. The uranium is very precious to us in the sense that it can be used as fuel for the Safari reactor to manufacture medical isotopes.

[Robinson] I can deduce from what you have said that South Africa's under signing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was in other words delayed up until the stage when we were sure that such weapons did not exist in South Africa.

[Stumpf] One could say that. I think in that regard we acted very genuinely, and when we signed the treaty we really did not have the capabilities any more.

[Robinson] Were there inspections by the International Atomic Energy Corporation or Agency?

[Stumpf] That is correct. The inspections commenced in November 1991, after we signed the guarantee agreement on 16 September.

[Robinson] Were you given a certificate that they acknowledged the fact that such weapons no longer existed?

[Stumpf] At this stage, they were not yet aware of the weapons, they in fact gave us all the certification that all the material and facilities which we declared could be accounted for. They will now have access to documentation which reflects the existence and the dismantling of the weapons.

[Robinson] Did they have any suspicion that such weapons existed?

[Stumpf] That I would not know. You will have to ask them.

[Robinson] I just want to ask you, regarding your relations currently with the International Atomic Energy Agency. What exactly is the relationship now?

[Stumpf] Mr. Robinson, the relationship is very positive. You know, we maintain a very open relationship with them, but also a professional relationship, and the relationship is in fact very positive in the sense that they have no problems with what we have declared. In fact, with our declaration of material and facilities, they made the statement that it was the most complete and professional submission of an inventory which they had ever seen anywhere in the world.

[Robinson] You say the uranium is still there and it can be used, but I have also heard that the Americans would like to buy that uranium. Would you consider it?

[Stumpf] They could be thinking about it, but there has been no negotiations. Our view is that we have a use for it, a commercial use, which could make South Africa a renowned isotopes manufacturer.

[Robinson] To what use could that be put?

[Stumpf] As I said, to make the Safari reactor really commercial, so that it could produce medical isotopes on a large scale.

[Robinson] Only for medicinal use?

[Stumpf] That is correct, yes.

[Robinson] I think we have come a long way. All I now want to know from you is: Supposing that uranium is still in your possession, as you say, and there are people who had the expertise and the knowledge, and who then were involved in the construction of those devices, or weapons rather, could they not do it again?

[Stumpf] It is technically almost impossible, Mr. Robinson. You know the material has been stored under very safe conditions, which fully comply with the convention for the physical protection of the material. South Africa is a signatory to this convention. The vaults in which the material has been stored are fully sealed by the AEC, and every three, four weeks they get inspected, there are even cameras set up. It would get known very quickly if one would try to illegally remove the materials from the vaults.

[Robinson] Who inspects them?

[Stumpf] The agency personnel from Vienna, AEC agents.

[Robinson] So it is under international supervision?

[Stumpf] Absolutely.

[Robinson] Thank you Dr. Stumpf for your participation. I think we could come back to you, but I think I have to talk to Mr. Botha. Mr. Botha, let's start with you. Can you tell us why the devices were built in the first place? From your mouth.

[Botha] I was not part of that decision, the decision was taken in 1974, so I have to rely on assumptions and deductions which I have to make, and on the strategy which was outlined to me later. If we go back to that time, that was the time when South Africa was nearing international isolation, it was the time when 50,000 Cuban troops moved into Angola. There is no doubt that a conventional threat existed for us. The Soviet Union was burdened with regional conflict in southern Africa, South Africa could not obtain weapons from anywhere, and was standing alone in the world, and if I follow the general trend of thought, the idea was to see to it that one had to develop a maximum deterrent for an eventuality such as if the Soviet Union would attack the country, then one could for instance, go to America or to Britain or France, and say look, if you do not intervene now and prevent it, then we will consider using this deterrent.

[Robinson] Against who?

[Botha] Well, against the forces that want to attack you or want to invade you.

[Robinson] In southern Africa?

[Botha] In southern Africa or elsewhere. If you had the means, such as a vehicle to deliver the device at long range, you could adopt a threatening stance. The major point is that a deterrent, it does not matter where you use a deterrent, you must first have credibility that you do have something like that.

[Robinson] But has there ever been such credibility, because South Africa always denied it had it [the device]?

[Botha] No, no, no. I think you are putting it too simply, you suspected just as much as I did that we had it, and the whole world suspected it.

[Robinson] So there were suspicions?

[Botha] Yes.

[Robinson] But South Africa had not said it did not have it.

[Botha] Exactly, and the point was, we wanted to create an element of uncertainty, it was strategic consideration, it was exactly that uncertainty which prevailed, and I repeat, the country was standing alone, it was isolated, there was a conventional threat against it, and this was intended as a strategic deterrent.

[Robinson] You say we wanted to use it as a strategic deterrent, in other words you yourself were later part of that misconception that you wanted to create among the people?

[Botha] No, I do not agree with you. I do not know how you got to the word misconception, that is your own invention, not mine. The government had a responsibility, and I want to state to you tonight that most of the countries in the world also suspected that we were about to do something like that. So it is not a misconception which was created. The element of uncertainty which came about, was in fact intended to serve as a deterrent.

[Robinson] But were you part of that element of uncertainty?

[Botha] I inherited it, yes.

[Robinson] And you knew it?

[Botha] Later, yes.

[Robinson] When is later?

[Botha] In the 80s, when the things [devises] were completed.

[Robinson] How many members of the cabinet knew about it?

[Botha] That is not for me to discuss in this fashion, not matters which resort under the government.

[Robinson] Let me take the matter further up to until about two, three weeks ago when you were in America. Then it was stated in papers, why, I do not know because I was not there, that the Americans want to buy our enriched uranium. Did you, or anybody else, talk to them along those lines?

[Botha] No, I did not talk to them about that, I was in the USA last week. The Americans' concern was that we could perhaps at some time, sell these things to an irresponsible government which harbored hostility toward the USA, or that we would not declare all our enriched uranium to the international agency, or that we had hidden some of the weapons. That, in a nutshell, was the cause for American concern.

[Robinson] Did you then tell them that we had such devises?

[Botha] No, I told them that within two weeks, two weeks from last Thursday, today is Wednesday, I said to them that two weeks from last Thursday we will allay their fears. I said: "We will allay your fears within two weeks." [quoted statement in English]. And after that they were satisfied, and the first reaction today from the U.S. was positive, they are satisfied with this declaration, the reaction from the International Atomic Energy Agency was positive, I am expecting a positive response from Britain, from Russia—which is the other signatory to NPT, I expect generally a positive reaction worldwide, because we have actually set an example for other countries to follow. We are the first country in the world to voluntarily, I repeat voluntarily, decide to destroy and dismantle such nuclear weapon devises, and we ought to serve as an example for other countries. I think the major powers, the nuclear powers, will welcome this step from us, as we were under no obligation to do it. The obligation in fact started the day we signed the Nonproliferation Treaty, and from that day on, South Africa complied with every requirement of the international agency. We went even further. We did what, strictly speaking, was not expected of us for the sake of commercial reasons, and also to make sure that we can now tell the world: Yes, we did have it. We have outlined our reasons, we said we destroyed it voluntarily, and through this our credibility internationally will increase.

[Robinson] Mr. Botha, you are aware there is a second instance mentioned, the missile control system, which has a very complicated name in English. The Americans were inter alia afraid that South Africa could distribute or use nuclear weapons through missiles. The question is whether South Africa is going to be part of that second system, that is, to limit the building or the distribution of missiles.

[Botha] We would very much like to. This matter I have already discussed with them, even as far back as two years ago, I said to them we want to be part of this club. Because we have this technology, but that we only wanted to utilize it for commercial and peaceful purposes. But even there you have a point. The Americans and other Western powers had built up a fear—weapons of mass destruction had to be controlled. We are saying we invite the American private sector, we invite the French, we invite the Italians, the Germans, to develop these systems further. Then they will have a guarantee as allies, that nothing will be done here which will work against their interests in practice. So we would very much like to be a member of that controlling body which you referred to, and be part of the club, then they will have additional assurance that sales, transfers of this technology to governments who are hostile toward them, will not take place.

[Robinson] Mr. Botha, thank you very much for your participation tonight, thank you too Dr. Stumpf, for clearing up some of these points.

[Botha, Stumpf] Thank you.

**Article Views 'Real Reasons' for Nuclear Program**

*MB2603175693 Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL  
in English 26 Mar-1 Apr 93 pp 3, 5*

[Report by Stephan Laufer and Arthur Gavshon: "The Real Reasons for SA's Nukes"]

[Text] President FW de Klerk hid more than he revealed when informing parliament this week of South Africa's nuclear weapons capability.

Sources intimate with the country's A-bomb programme have told THE WEEKLY MAIL that South Africa's nuclear weapons capability was "on the technological cutting edge internationally". The programme gave the South African Defence Force a huge destructive potential.

And the programme cost vastly more than has thus far been officially revealed. Professor Renfrew Christie, Dean of Research at the University of the Western Cape, estimates that the apartheid A-bomb cost South African taxpayers R[Rand]8-billion, more than 10 times the R700-million to R800-million figure given by De Klerk. Christie would know—he was sentenced to 10 years in jail in 1980 for passing South African nuclear secrets to the African National Congress [ANC].

Speaking in Washington, a senior American official said: "The South African statement obviously is welcome as far as it goes but we have not necessarily heard the whole story of its nuclear weapons activities."

South Africa possessed nuclear "smart bombs" able to fly themselves to pinpoint targets in a manner similar to the conventional bombs used by US forces in the Gulf war.

The SADF [South African Defence Force] was also in possession of smaller nuclear devices which could have been used in battlefield situations. "This was probably the real motivation for spending so much money on developing the G5 and G6 cannon," said Christie. The G5 and G6 would have allowed artillery gunners to lob a small two kiloton nuclear warhead up to 42km into enemy territory, causing massive destruction while limiting damage to the South African side.

Speaking on condition of strict anonymity, another expert told THE WEEKLY MAIL "the size and sophistication of the South African devices was such that they could have been packed in a satchel and taken anywhere". The international community has long been perturbed at the existence of such "backpack bombs" because of their terrorist potential.

And while De Klerk told parliament that the decision to build A-bombs had been taken in 1974, it is clear that nuclear weapons research was started in earnest in South Africa as early as the 1950s. Documents dating back to the Strydom era show research into the military implications of a nuclear capability, and assessments of the resources required were made in the 1960s.

One of the more bizarre research programmes related to the creation of a nuclear weapons capability emerged at Christie's trial in 1980. It involved an analysis of the potential use of nuclear explosions for engineering purposes such as major earth movement for dam building, an activity classified internationally at the time as a peaceful use of nuclear power. But the South African study had concentrated on assessing potential effects of nuclear engineering explosions in "black" areas of the country.

De Klerk told parliament that South Africa had developed its nuclear weapons capability without outside help. No so, say the experts. Germany, France, Canada and the United States—and perhaps others—assisted at one stage or another. And the double flash registered in the South Atlantic in 1979 by American spy satellites was probably an Israeli nuclear test, conducted with the help of the South Africans, says French expert Marie-Helen Labbe. The South Africans will have shared in the test results.

Hoping for a reliable supply of enriched uranium for their nuclear power plants, and intent on testing new technologies, the Germans provided key technology for the pilot uranium enrichment plant built in South Africa in 1975, according to Barbara Rogers and Zdenek Servenka in their book on nuclear co-operation between the two countries.

The US, a customer for South African uranium since the mid-1940s and keen to enhance its edge in the nuclear arms race with the Soviets, built South Africa's first research reactor, Safari 1, say the authors. It also trained South African nuclear scientists.

Asked why De Klerk had chosen to spill the beans now, diplomatic sources in Washington said it was probably a pre-emptive strike aimed at damage control. De Klerk and Foreign Minister Pik Botha were keen to prevent divulgence of South Africa's true nuclear capability, including the advanced nature of the arsenal, by the US State Department.

Secretary of State Warren Christopher, it appears, indicated to Botha last week in Washington his intention to make public South Africa's standing as a nuclear power if Pretoria did not do so itself. The government's prompt response, says Professor Jac Spence, of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, can be seen as a "signal of good intentions to the new Clinton administration, which is concerned about nuclear proliferation".

**Heitman Discusses Implications of Nuclear Capabilities**

*MB2603083793 Johannesburg SABC TV 1 Network  
in English 1830 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Interview with Helmoed Heitman of JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY, in the Cape Town Studio by Penny Smythe in the Johannesburg Studio on the "Agenda" program—live]

[Text] [Smythe] In our Cape Town studio to discuss the military implications of South Africa's nuclear capabilities is Helmoed Heitman of JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY. Good evening Mr. Heitman.

[Heitman] Good evening.

[Smythe] South Africa's nuclear developments came about at a time when the government of that day was preaching a great deal of total onslaught. Why, from a military point of view, did South Africa need a nuclear deterrent in the first place?

[Heitman] I think it is more a political military drama than a military thing in the sense that all nuclear weapons really are more political tools than they ever are weapons. The problem facing South Africa militarily in the mid-70s, was that should sovereign expansionism, which at that stage was pretty much riding high, have done some more than it did in southern Africa. The South African armed forces were pretty well unequipped to deal with it. They were very short of heavy equipment, they were facing difficulties in getting new heavy equipment, and obviously were grossly outmatched by, even Soviet surrogates, let alone the Soviets. So the theory there was perhaps that a little bit of that deterrent element might be worth having.

[Smythe] But do you think sanctions actually pushed South Africa into creating a nuclear deterrent in the first place?

[Heitman] I think the suspicion that effective armed sanctions were on the way, yes, that would have been a major factor in looking at nuclear weapons, because

really, nuclear weapons were not that terribly useful from a military viewpoint in the southern African theater.

[Smythe] But now at a time when South Africa was so isolated from international know-how and technology, how possible was it for South Africans to have conceived and created these nuclear devices completely alone without any help from outside?

[Heitman] Well, the basic process of creating a nuclear device is not that unknown, its expensive, its complex, but creating a thing that can in theory go bang when you need it is not impossible for a country with a first rate engineering electronics capability.

[Smythe] Because there have been accusations that scientists from outside the country possibly from eastern Europe, have been in here to help local scientists. Do you believe that's not actually the case?

[Heitman] I doubt it quite honestly, you know the trick with nuclear weapons when it becomes complex, is if you're going into the more futuristic weapons, or if you're going into very small yield warheads, very complex warheads.

[Smythe] Speaking of accusations, there have also been accusations of collaboration or whatever you'd like to call it, between Israel and South Africa. To what extent do you believe that was the case?

[Heitman] I really don't know enough to say that I believe it or not. I certainly could accept it if I was told it happened I wouldn't be surprised, but I haven't any information really to confirm it or deny it.

[Smythe] Right, Mr. Heitman, thank you very much for your time from Cape Town this evening and your contribution to Agenda.

## JAPAN

### MITI May Offer Knowledge on Curbing Arms Proliferation

*OW1603130893 Tokyo KYODO in English 1146 GMT 16 Mar 93*

[Text] Tokyo, March 16 KYODO—Japan's trade and industry ministry is considering offering arms export control know-how to about 10 Asian nations to spur them into signing international agreements curbing weapons of mass destruction, ministry officials said Tuesday [15 March].

The officials said the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) plans to hold a seminar on arms export control as early as this fall in an Asian country.

The countries include Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and South Korea. MITI also would accept trainees from these countries, the officials said.

They said progress in technology has enabled these Asian nations to produce materials and machine tools which can be used in making lethal weapons such as nuclear arms.

To date these countries have not controlled exports of such materials and machinery, they said.

The ministry has already sounded out Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, they said.

The four countries generally showed a positive reaction to the Japan's offer, the officials said.

## NORTH KOREA

### Foreign Ministry Issues Memorandum on NPT

*SK1503234593 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 1300 GMT 15 Mar 93*

[DPRK Foreign Ministry memorandum]

[Text] A DPRK Foreign Ministry memorandum on the truth of the nuclear inspection of our country by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]:

The DPRK, prompted by its antinuclear policy for peace, joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT], effectuated the nuclear safeguards accord, and has faithfully received the inspections by the IAEA in order to force the U.S. nuclear weapons out of South Korea, to eliminate a nuclear threat against us, and to further turn the Korean peninsula into a non-nuclear zone. In this process, the honesty of the peaceful nuclear policy of the Government of our Republic has been confirmed, and the international trust in us has been further enhanced. However, the United States, mentioning suspicion of our nuclear development, a fictitious allegation, violated its obligations pursuant to the treaty which it should strictly observe as a state possessing nuclear weapons. It manipulated some circles and some member states of the IAEA Secretariat and had the IAEA's

February Board of Governors meeting adopt an unjust resolution forcing inspections of our military installations which have nothing to do with nuclear activities, while resuming the Team Spirit joint military exercise—a test nuclear war exercise—against our country, a nonnuclear state, with the South Korean authorities.

The situation that has been created made it impossible for the government of our republic to implement the obligations pursuant to the nuclear safeguards accord any longer. The DPRK Foreign Ministry issues this memorandum because it thinks it necessary to clarify the truth of the nuclear inspections of our country by the IAEA.

1. The sincere efforts of the Government of the Republic for the implementation of the nuclear safeguards accord:

The nuclear safeguards accord between the DPRK and the IAEA was signed on 30 January 1992 and effectuated on 10 April 1992. We submitted to the IAEA the initial report on the inventory of nuclear materials and the design notification on nuclear facilities which we were supposed to submit pursuant to Articles 42 and 60 on 4 May 1992, far ahead of the deadline stipulated in the accord. With a view to fully opening up our nuclear activities, we notified the IAEA on even the specifications of nuclear facilities and the specifications of scientific research institutions which do not fall under the safeguards accord.

To help the IAEA fully understand the overall status of nuclear activities in our country and their peaceful nature, we invited the IAEA delegation led by its director general to our country in May 1992, showed the delegation not only the nuclear facilities falling under the safeguard accord but the nuclear facilities that do not fall under the safeguards accord as well. We even went so far as to show the delegation other nonnuclear facilities. We showed the IAEA director general and his entourage not only the nuclear facilities under construction but the underground structures as well.

The IAEA conducted six rounds of nonregular inspections from 4 May 1992, when the DPRK submitted the initial report and other relevant documents to the IAEA, to early February 1993. During this period, the IAEA inspectors confirmed the design notification [solgye tongbo] by facilities, conducted as planned the extraction of test samples and the examination of measurement and operational record documents [chukchong mit unyong kirok munkkon chosa] necessary for the verification of the initial report. At every time necessary, the IAEA inspectors gave their agreement and installed surveillance devices [kamsi kigu].

Our facility operators provided the inspectors with maximum convenience and active cooperation so that the inspectors could fulfill their duty smoothly.

When inspectors demanded an extract of high-radioactivity waste water (?circuitry) at the radioactive-chemical laboratory, our facility operators exposed themselves to more than the maximum permissible exposure level to take the (?sample). When the IAEA inspectors demanded a guarantee of conditions for measurement of (?waste) fuel in the test atomic energy power station, we ensured necessary working conditions through complicated operational and manipulation procedures, although this impaired the safety and the operation of the facilities.

The initial report that the DPRK submitted to the IAEA fully reflected our nuclear activities. However, we also sent other supplementary materials in a timely manner since the inspectors said that such materials were required for verifying the initial report.

Thanks to our active support, the IAEA inspectors could fulfill their mission as planned without any inconvenience. The IAEA inspectors again expressed thanks for our sincere cooperation. This was clearly pointed out even in reports submitted to the Board of Governors meetings by the IAEA's director-general.

## 2. Unreasonable Assertions of Some Officials of the IAEA Secretariat:

Some officials of the IAEA secretariat insisted that inconsistencies existed in principle between our report and the result of the IAEA's measurement. But none of the claimed inconsistencies in principle exist.

Discrepancies between information we provided and the result of the IAEA's measurement are not alleged inconsistencies. The discrepancies originated from the IAEA's own disregard of our conditions for the operation of facilities and also from the artificial fabrication by some officials of the IAEA Secretariat of the result of the inspections.

The characteristic features of our nuclear activities are that we have maintained the principle of self-reliance in the nuclear energy development, proceeding from our country's subjective and objective conditions and that we have submitted to the IAEA inspections our nuclear facilities which were still at the experimental stage, not in regular operation, from the viewpoint of the inspection. Some officials of the IAEA Secretariat should, as a matter of course, have taken into consideration such characteristics of our nuclear activities in interpreting the result of the inspections.

However, they lacked the right standpoint and attitude to clarify any point at issue and, therefore, deliberately made the matter complicated, raising a hasty fuss even before seeking any consultation with the operators.

The operators have the best knowledge on concrete conditions of the facilities. Therefore, it is indispensable

for the inspectors to consult with the operators. However, the IAEA inspectors, showing suspicions first, began to apply pressure instead of striving to resolve problems that were raised.

The fourth irregular inspection team [pijonggi sachaldan], came to our country from 2 to 14 November 1992, and demanded official talks in Pyongyang before going down to the spot. At the talks, the inspectors claimed, "More nuclear materials should be declared," "This is the last chance for revising the initial report," and "If one misses this opportunity, miserable consequences will follow," thus attempting to threaten us.

Our facility operators gave scientific and technical explanation on concrete operational conditions of the facilities and advised them to correctly interpret measurement results.

After going down to where the facilities are located, the inspectors had a better understanding of the real status of the facilities and after holding concrete consultations with the operators, they admitted that many of their views were based on excessively hasty conclusions.

Summing up the inspection before their return, the inspectors said that they heard a number of detailed explanations and gained beneficial materials.

The sixth irregular inspection team, which came from 26 January to 6 February 1993, applied pressure by saying that the issue of two principle discrepancies is a serious one that needs to be resolved urgently.

The first principle inconsistency, according to some officials of the IAEA Secretariat, is that the composition and quantity of plutonium we declared to the IAEA does not correspond to what was calculated by the IAEA.

Our facility specialists input source data that reflects reality into computers to obtain correct calculation results. The result corresponded to the composition and quantity of plutonium extracted from the melting fuel rods. This fact leaves no room for controversy. But the inspection team calculation results differed remarkably from our calculated output.

The inspection team failed to specifically explain the process of its calculation but only insisted on its calculated figure, saying that the IAEA calculation team applied universally recognized calculation codes to the appropriate source data.

Our facility operators said that we had also reviewed our calculations as this issue has been raised since the fourth irregular inspection, and proved in a reverse manner how the result of calculation was attained.

The inspectors failed to answer our questions of "What is wrong in our calculation," and "What is insufficient in our explanation."

Summing up technological consultations, they said that they learned many things from consultations and that

since they obtained useful materials from operational records, they will calculate them again after returning to the IAEA. They promised to again hold meetings for consultation.

Our side handed over our calculation data as a document to the inspection team. However, the IAEA director-general proposed special inspections on 9 February, even before the sixth inspection team recalculated data upon returning to Vienna on 8 February.

The second principle inconsistency raised by some officials of the IAEA Secretariat is that the composition of plutonium extracted by the radiochemical laboratory does not correspond to that of the liquid waste.

The main point here is to correctly understand its cause. The cause was fully clarified by our scientists who explained that the difference came from when the solution from the basic experiment of plutonium extraction in 1975 was placed in the relevant waste tank.

During talks between us and the IAEA Secretariat in Vienna, Austria, on 20 and 21 February, we answered assertions of some officials of the IAEA Secretariat who insisted that the quantity and composition of plutonium extracted during the basic experimental process in the radiochemical laboratory were not consistent with the results calculated by the IAEA with scientific, technological, and logical explanations using concrete data, materials, and proof.

While some officials of the IAEA Secretariat admitted their mistakes in principle in their calculation, they said, nevertheless, that they could not accept our calculated result until the results were confirmed to be based on the data of the operating records in the facilities.

Despite the fact that the inspectors already saw the pertinent documents of proof, they stubbornly denied that they could see them.

We submitted all required documents, including the initial report which needs to be submitted in accordance with the safeguards accord in advance, and showed all documents kept at the facilities, including operating records, to the IAEA inspectors during the course of six rounds of irregular inspections.

Some officials of the IAEA Secretariat recklessly denied all facts and scientific and technological proof. This was so as to work out a pretext for a special inspection of the two military facilities by unreasonably linking them to the issue of inconsistencies according to the scenario prepared in advance by the United States.

The unreasonable assertions of some officials of the IAEA Secretariat were that they want to inspect our two sites. The two sites they claim are military facilities have nothing to do with nuclear activities and therefore, we have no obligation to show them to the IAEA.

The issue is that some officials of the IAEA want to inspect military facilities, which are not nuclear-related facilities, with false intelligence offered by a third country.

In this connection we cannot but look back on what happened in the past. Last September, the IAEA's director general suddenly demanded that IAEA inspection team members conducting the third irregular inspection in our country at the time, be allowed to see two sites, which have nothing to do with nuclear activities, in the form of a visit.

Although showing installations not under the safeguards agreement to inspection team members visiting our country to inspect nuclear facilities contradicted the spirit of the agreement reached last May, we showed the installations on the two sites, as it was the director-general's first request. One site was a workshop producing daily necessities, and the other site was a military installation.

At that time, the inspection team members looked around these two sites in their capacity as official members of the IAEA and searched every nook and cranny of each room with inspection instruments as policemen search the house of a criminal.

After the inspection team members looked around the military installations, they asked for permission to look around the inside of the building again, and we allowed them to do so only to circumvent the possibility of having other IAEA members visit our country to look around them in the future. After looking around the two sites, they admitted that the sites had nothing to do with the nuclear activities. Their visit was not related to the implementation of the safeguards agreement but was permitted only thanks to our good will.

However, some officials of the IAEA Secretariat misused the visit in confirming the espionage information provided by a third country. Therefore, in a letter sent to the IAEA director-general we pointed out clearly that such groundless requests for visits or inspections would no longer be permitted and that that was the first and last time. But, on 22 December last year the IAEA director-general again asked for permission to visit, drill, and take samplings at the military installation they had already visited as well as another military installation. Saying that he would send an unofficial delegation to our country, he demanded that the issue be discussed and settled quietly.

We do not find it necessary to classify visits to the sites as open or secret. If the installations need to be shown in the course of implementing the safeguards agreement, we ought to show them, and if we think otherwise, we cannot show them, even in secret. This is a matter related to our sovereignty. Therefore, we sternly rejected the IAEA Secretariat's request.

At bilateral talks in Pyongyang from 20 and 22 January this year, the negotiating delegation of the IAEA Secretariat argued that the visit to the two sites was necessary because, first of all, the sites were related to inconsistencies found in the course of irregular inspections and, second, there was reliable evidence that the sites are related to the nuclear material.

Our side explained that such inconsistencies allegedly found in the course of irregular inspections did not exist, that the inconsistencies would be clarified through further irregular inspections, that there were no grounds to assert that the two sites were related to the inconsistencies raised by the negotiating delegation, and that the two sites are military installations with no relevance to our nuclear activities. Our side then refuted the arguments about the importance and urgency of the proposed visit the IAEA Secretariat impatiently insisted upon. Our side also demanded that the IAEA negotiating delegation identify the source of the reliable evidence for their allegations that the sites were related to nuclear activities.

The IAEA negotiating delegation did not hesitate in revealing that it was using intelligence information provided by a third country, and added that if the country in question is identified it would deteriorate relations between that country and the DPRK. When our side asked for clarification on the legal grounds for using information provided by a third country, the IAEA negotiating delegation avoided answering the question, saying that it much time is needed for such an explanation.

Citing pertinent provisions, we made it clear that the IAEA has no legal grounds for using intelligence information provided by a third country, that the agency is not the police, and that such an attempt is a violation of the agency's statute and regulations, the safeguards accord, and the spirit of the decisions of the December 1991 and February 1992 Board of Governors meetings.

An agency official who tried to put pressure on us, insisting that he had been specialized in international law, became dumbfounded at our side's rebuttal, and finally admitted that the matter concerning the use of surveillance data provided by a third country is not clearly mentioned in the agency's basic documents.

We made clear that the agency Secretariat's assertions were unreasonable from a legal point of view, and strongly urged the agency not to get implicated in the false intelligence information provided by a country hostile to us, but to return to its original standpoint as an impartial international organization, taking into account the political and military situation prevailing on the Korean peninsula.

### 3. Behind-the-scenes manipulation of some officials of the IAEA Secretariat by the United States:

IAEA inspections of our country have so far been conducted under the manipulation of the United States, not according to the agency's statute and the safeguards agreement.

The IAEA is obligated to protect secrets that it obtained in the course of the inspections under Article 5 of the safeguards agreement. However, some officials of the IAEA Secretariat have handed the results of its inspections of our country over to the United States and South Korea.

THE [INTERNATIONAL] HERALD TRIBUNE, a U.S. daily newspaper, reported on 5 May 1992 that an IAEA spokesman said North Korea provided the IAEA with a list of nuclear facilities as thick as a small telephone directory on 4 May. It also said that North Korea made public the three previously undisclosed nuclear reactors.

South Korea's Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation [MBC] reported on 8 November 1992 that the agency was known to have been planning to send a high-level delegation to Pyongyang immediately after the fourth irregular inspection was over. At that time, only a few officials of the agency's Secretariat knew about this, and we received this information from the IAEA by telex on 16 November, eight days after the South Korean MBC report.

South Korea's MBC reported on 13 November 1992 that upon receiving the results of the nuclear inspections of North Korea, the U.S. Government had been closely analyzing them.

Some officials of the IAEA Secretariat continued to demand that we disclose the lists of our nuclear material and nuclear facilities submitted to the agency and, on the other hand, unilaterally made public the issues related to the inspections without any prior agreement with us.

A senior agency official told our representative there on 6 May 1992 that the agency cannot tell anyone about the content of the report which your country reported because the agency's regulations ban it from making public the content to third parties. He also said: I think that your country can appropriately inform the United States and Japan of the content of the report to hasten the improvement of relations between the DPRK and the United States and between the DPRK and Japan.

On 10 June 1992, a senior agency official called an informal meeting of the members of the IAEA Board of Governors and briefed them on this visit to our country and on the course of the first irregular inspection and disclosed the capability of our country's nuclear facilities in detail.

The United States cooked up slanderous information with regard to our nuclear activities and distributed it to Japan and other countries, as well as the IAEA Secretariat.

Japan's JIJI PRESS made a false report on 16 November 1990 that according to the U.S. satellite photos obtained by the Japanese Government, there exist such nuclear facilities such as a Soviet-made research reactor, a small nuclear reactor, an enriched uranium plant, a fuel reprocessing plant, and a nuclear explosion test ground.

The United States has systematically interfered in the IAEA's inspection of us and instigated the IAEA Secretariat to impose a special inspection of us.

Last year, in a report submitted to the National Security Council at the White House, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency said that the United States should include members that the United States can trust on a special inspection team.

We notified the IAEA of our stand that we could not allow the IAEA officials from countries with which our country does not have diplomatic relations to be included on the inspection team. In accordance with the U.S. demand, however, some IAEA officials tried to send inspection team members from countries with which we do not have diplomatic relations.

The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency report, which was recently submitted to the National Security Council at the White House, noted that the United States must now induce North Korea to accept special inspection and must formulate a policy toward North Korea according to the outcome of the nuclear inspection.

The United States invited the IAEA director general to take part in a congressional hearing on 22 September last year. The United States got him to explain about our nuclear plan and forced him to conduct a special inspection and a surprise inspection [kisup sachal] of the DPRK facilities.

So far, the DPRK has sincerely accepted the nuclear inspections and clarified the so-called inconsistencies [pulilchijom] on a scientific and technological basis. Nevertheless, the United States has manipulated some officials of the IAEA Secretariat and certain member states to accept, at the IAEA board of governors meeting on 25 February, an unjust resolution demanding an inspection of DPRK military installations that have nothing to do with nuclear activities.

Various facts show that the resolution, which has been fabricated by some officials of the IAEA Secretariat and certain member countries following the United States, cannot be justified from an international viewpoint or from a scientific or technological viewpoint.

The DPRK Government sharply denounces and resolutely rejects the fabrication of the unjust resolution against the DPRK by some officials of the IAEA Secretariat and certain member states. We regard the unjust resolution as a wanton violation of the sovereignty of the DPRK and as a robber's act to disarm the DPRK.

Some officials of the IAEA Secretariat and certain member states joined the plots and maneuvers of the United States and the South Korean authorities to toy with our country's sovereignty and security. By so doing, they committed a great crime against our people. The authority and confidence of the IAEA, which regards fairness as a principle of action, are utterly lost.

We cannot stand by with folded arms while the United States and South Korean authorities resume the Team Spirit joint military exercises, which had been discontinued, and while they are pertinaciously committing

machinations against our country in collaboration with some officials of the IAEA Secretariat.

Because of such acts, the DPRK has entered a semi-war state to safeguard its sovereignty and security and has decided to withdraw from the NPT to defend its supreme interests. This is a self-defensive measure to defend our nation's dignity and its right to survive and a just measure to safeguard the common interests of the states that do not possess nuclear weapons.

Neither pressure nor arm-twisting acts will ever work with us.

The United States must give up its outdated Cold War era way of thinking and immediately stop its imprudent practice of manipulating the IAEA to force us to open up our military installations and stifle our socialist system.

Some officials of the IAEA Secretariat and certain member states must apologize for the crimes they have committed against the Korean people. They should refrain from acting under the pressure and directive of a particular country.

The DPRK Government expresses its hope that IAEA member states and the world's peace-loving people will impartially assess, on the basis of the IAEA stipulations and the Nuclear Safeguards Accord, the issues that have arisen between the DPRK and the IAEA in the course of implementing the safeguards accord, and oppose and reject the unjust acts by the United States and some officials of the IAEA Secretariat.

#### Roundtable Talk on DPRK's Withdrawal From NPT

SK2603041593 Pyongyang Korean Central  
Broadcasting Network in Korean 0535 GMT 23 Mar 93

[First installment of roundtable talk with station reporter Yi Chung-song as moderator; Yi Hong-sop, general director of the Atomic Energy Research Center; Dr. Yun Chang-ho, head of the Nuclear Physics Research Institute; Dr. Yi Sang-kun, head of the Radioactive Chemistry Research Institute; and Choe Chong-sun and Chang Song-hak, directors of bureaus of the Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry; panel members are not identified when they speak: "Our Sincerity Shown in Implementing the Agreement"]

[Text] [Yi Chung-song] How are you? You are the experts and scientists in the atomic energy industry sector of our country who took part directly in the six irregular inspections [pichonggyu sachal] conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] and who participated in a series of negotiations with the IAEA when its February Board of Governors meeting was held in Vienna. I think you can prove with material and data more concretely than anyone else the justness of our government's statement declaring its stern decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT]. This is why I have invited you to this meeting today.

[Panelist] Let me speak first. As everyone knows, our government's stern decision to withdraw from the NPT is a very patriotic and just measure to defend our nation's dignity and sovereignty and to defend our country's supreme interest and security. Our country was no longer able to implement the duties pursuant to the nuclear safeguards agreement under an abnormal [pichongsangjok] situation created by the manuevers against our republic by the United States, the South Korean authorities, and some officials at the IAEA Secretariat. In this kind of situation our country had to take a self-defensive measure. This was the reason our republic had to withdraw from the NPT.

[Panelist] That is right. By nature, our joining the NPT was intended to gain something favorable by eliminating the nuclear threat against us based on the strength of the treaty. Proceeding from this purpose, our country joined the NPT on 12 December 1985.

[Yi] We joined that international organization for the purpose of having U.S. nuclear weapons withdrawn from South Korea, eliminating the nuclear threat of the United States, and making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free peace zone. Thus, before we begin discussing the basic issue, I would like briefly to discuss with you some questions: What is the NPT? What is the nuclear safeguards agreement? What is the relationship between the IAEA, the NPT, and the nuclear safeguards agreement, and so forth?

[Panelist] Let me speak first. In a nutshell, the NPT is a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The basic content of the NPT stipulates that countries that possess nuclear weapons shall not hand nuclear weapons or technology on manufacturing nuclear weapon over to other countries, and that countries that possess nuclear weapons shall not pose a nuclear threat to nonnuclear countries.

It also stipulates that nonnuclear countries should not acquire nuclear weapons or technology related to the production of nuclear weapons.

Countries that have nuclear weapons means those countries that conducted a nuclear weapons test before 1 January 1967. These countries include the former Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, France, and China.

[Yi] They are the permanent member states of the UN Security Council, are they not?

[Panelist] That is right. As for the safeguards agreement, it sets forth the procedures stipulating the obligations of the nonnuclear countries pursuant to the NPT. This agreement is signed by the signatory states of the NPT and the IAEA.

[Yi] Is it not a bilateral agreement?

[Panelist] Yes, we can call it a bilateral agreement. According to this agreement, the IAEA has the right to conduct nuclear inspections of the signatory states, and the signatory states are obligated to receive nuclear

inspections. According to this agreement, the IAEA conducts nuclear inspections of the signatory states.

[Panelist] The nuclear inspections are, figuratively speaking, similar to an audit of banking institutions or the inventory of stores. We can divide the IAEA inspections largely into three categories: nonregular inspections, regular inspections, and special inspections. The six nonregular inspections we received were to enable the IAEA to objectively verify the accuracy and completeness of our initial report to the IAEA on the nuclear material.

[Yi] They made on-the-spot verification, did they not?

[Panelist] Yes, they did. At the same time, the IAEA verifies first-hand the accuracy of our report on the designs. These were the purposes of the six rounds of the nonregular inspections we have received. Regular inspections can usually be conducted after the nonregular inspections or on some other occasions. During regular inspections, they objectively review the change in the quantity of the nuclear material from documents or by on-the-spot examination.

[Yi] As the term itself says, they conduct inspections regularly.

[Panelist] That is right. Special inspections are inspections that are conducted under abnormal circumstances.

[Yi] Has the IAEA ever decided to conduct special inspections in the past?

[Panelist] Working for the IAEA, I have participated in a number of inspections. The history of IAEA inspections shows that the IAEA has not conducted a special inspection before.

[Yi] As we are all aware, the government of our republic signed the NPT from an antinuclear position for peace. Since then it has made every possible effort to carry out faithfully its obligations under the treaty. The six nonregular inspections proves this.

[Panelist] The IAEA inspectors have conducted six inspections of our nuclear facilities [haek sisol]. In addition to the research institutes engaged in developing nuclear energy, we also have various nuclear facilities that are built on the basis of the results our research and on the firm foundation of our country's self-reliant national economy.

As is well known, all of our nuclear activities are thoroughly peaceful in their mission and content, and all of our nuclear facilities are independent ones [chuchejogin kosimnida] which we have built for ourselves. Therefore, when they conduct inspections on us, we have nothing to hide, nor do we have anything about which we feel dishonorable [ttottotchi mothage saenggakhanun].

We have received nuclear inspections six times, sincerely showing everything just as it is. Our first duty under the Nuclear Safeguards Accord, which was effectuated in

April 1992, was to submit a primary report on the actual state of our nuclear materials by the end of April and a report on specifications of inspection targets [sachal taesang] by the end of May. We submitted those reports to the IAEA on 4 May, far ahead of the due date. By doing so, we prepared a favorable condition for the IAEA to inspect our country within a short time.

In addition, we invited the IAEA secretary general to inspections of our country, informing him in detail of our plans for nuclear development and inviting him to look at all of our nuclear facilities [haek sisol]. We showed him a 5,000 kw test atomic power plant; a 50,000 kw test atomic power plant under construction; a radiological laboratory, which is in the second phase of construction now; a nuclear fuel plant; the Nuclear Electronics Institute and the Radiological Institute in our research complex; an isotope processing plant; and the site of a 200,000 kw atomic power plant under construction.

We showed him not only nuclear facilities but also underground civilian air raid shelters in our research complex. Publications of Western countries, including the United States, once misled the public by saying that we are hiding huge secret nuclear facilities in these underground air raid shelters.

In addition to the places mentioned above, we showed him a uranium mine, a uranium ore plant, and all research institutes.

After nuclear inspections began, we helped inspectors in every way so that they could review our primary report on nuclear materials and the report on specifications on inspection targets as soon as possible. We provided them with all documents showing past nuclear activities at all of our nuclear facilities.

[Panelist] Yes, we did. Managers and operators of our facilities made sincere efforts to have IAEA inspectors conduct nuclear inspections in our country without difficulty, by offering every convenience to them.

Before conducting nuclear inspections in our country, IAEA inspectors demanded documents backing up the primary report we submitted, saying that our explanation and looking at facilities were not enough to verify it. However, we did not have any document prepared in advance for nuclear inspections, so we showed them the original files on our researchers' analyses, experiments, and (?questions) just as they were.

We also showed them research papers and documents on design, which are irrelevant to implementation of the Nuclear Safeguards Accord. We did not have to show them these papers and documents, but we opened them up as a part of our sincere efforts to prove our nuclear activities are innocent.

In addition, we let our researchers leave their work to help the inspectors. During the inspection periods, IAEA

inspectors looked at hundreds of pages of documents on our research activities and made copies of all the important ones for their own use.

[Yi] That means they learned a lot of scientific and technological knowledge from our country when they came here for nuclear inspections.

[Panelist] That is right. Given the documents they have seen when they visited our facilities, they must have fully understood our nuclear activities to date.

[Panelist] That is right. The atomic power plant also provided the inspectors with enough documents necessary. We showed the inspectors not only the (?three documents) on nuclear material but the design drawing of the nuclear reactor as well. The design drawing of the nuclear reactor is a secret technological document which the inspectors do not have a right to demand to see nor do we have the obligation to show them. Nevertheless, we showed them the design drawing. We also showed them the major facilities of the nuclear reactor and allowed them to take pictures upon their request.

We also gave them the documents on the operation (?data) of the nuclear reactor, the curve showing the monthly output of the nuclear reactor from the physical test in 1985 to the present, as well as its test data and computation data. The head of the inspection team and the inspectors thanked us many times for the data we gave them.

[Panelist] Moreover, we even showed them the paper we wrote when we conducted a basic plutonium test 18 years ago in 1975. According to the IAEA regulations, we do not have to do this. What we should do according to the regulations are two things. One is the initial report, and the other is the design notification. Nevertheless, we showed them everything.

[Panelist] We not only showed the inspectors all of the necessary recorded documents and data but actively assisted them in taking samples in the facilities.

[Yi] I suppose that a very dangerous and complex process was involved in assisting the inspectors in conducting the on-the-spot verifications, including taking the samples.

[Panelist] That is right. At our atomic power plant we helped the inspectors a lot in the on-the-spot inspections and on-the-spot assessment [hyonjang chukchung]. The inspectors' assessment of damaged fuel is an example. Damaged fuel is fuel that is removed because it was damaged during the operation of the nuclear reactor.

Because this fuel is burned in the nuclear reactor, the radioactivity is very high. Because it is damaged, it is a very dangerous process to help with the assessment as it gives off dust which can find its way into the body.

However, we demonstrated a spirit of cooperation and sincerely guaranteed the very complicated and dangerous work of taking out damaged fuel from the nuclear fuel storage house and taking it to the spot for assessment. Even under this kind of dangerous condition we demonstrated a spirit of cooperation and helped the inspectors' assessment.

[Panelist] You just said that we sincerely helped the inspectors in the assessment of our power stations. Under a very difficult and complicated condition, our Radioactive Chemistry Research Institute obtained many samples so that the inspectors could analyze them. To verify the design notification and primary report we submitted, they demanded that waste water be extracted from the waste water tank for analysis. Because a waste water tank is not necessary in our facilities, there are no facilities for sampling. Therefore, we created facilities for sampling as soon as possible and obtained samples for them.

They also demanded that we conduct sampling in an airtight room in our Radioactive Chemistry Research Institute. Since materials that are dealt with at our Radioactive Chemistry Research Institute are highly radioactive, we cannot touch the materials directly. All work is conducted by remote control in an airtight room. Therefore, it is very difficult to obtain samples. They are well aware of this.

However, since it is necessary to obtain samples for a complete and accurate verification of the design notification and primary report submitted by our country, we obtained samples and allowed the inspectors to analyze them. We took out the existing facilities and created new facilities for sampling.

Originally, obtaining samples and analyzing them was not a condition. However, to verify and prove our innocence we allowed samples to be obtained. Because we are completely innocent and the design notification is flawless, it was possible for us to take such dangerous risks and demonstrate a great spirit of cooperation.

[Panelist] That is not all. When it was impossible to obtain samples through this method, there were times when people obtained samples by going through a ventilating hole. Moreover, we accepted all of the inspectors' demands even though it was inconvenient for us while operating our facilities. That is, we accepted demands by the inspectors that were necessary in their verification work and in putting on seals and installing surveillance cameras for all facilities.

[Panelist] When inspectors verify nuclear materials, seals are put on and surveillance cameras are installed as supplementary devices. In principle, seals and surveillance cameras are put on and installed after agreed upon

in the supplementary regulations. However, in our case, even though the supplementary regulations were not yet effective, we accepted all of their demands.

[Yi] You mean during the irregular [pijonggi] inspection?

[Panelist] Yes. We [words indistinct] at the place they demanded. The inspectors are to give advance notification of one week when they install the surveillance cameras, that is, ask the side installing the surveillance cameras to make preparations for the installment at such and such a place. However, in this case, even though the inspectors were not able to give advance notification, we accepted all of their demands in accordance with the appointed time. This is very rare. We were really very cooperative.

[Panelist] Because we sincerely and actively cooperated with the inspectors, they gave us unsparing praise many times for our sincere cooperation during the six inspections. They also expressed gratitude and satisfaction.

[Panelist] During the whole period of the six irregular inspections, I accompanied the head of the IAEA's inspection delegation. He thanked me on various occasions and unsparingly praised us on how we had truly helped them. As the comrade director of the Radioactive Chemistry Research Institute said, when we obtained samples for them from waste water or when we gave samples to them from power stations under difficult conditions, they applauded us. He asked me to convey their greetings to the operators on several occasions.

[Yi] Through your comments, I believe it is clear to everyone that our republic's government received six IAEA irregular inspections very sincerely, which is in accordance with the obligation of the Nuclear Safeguards Accord. We shall end our talk here. Next time we will talk about how it was inevitable for our republic's government to take a resolute measure of withdrawing from the NPT.

#### Researcher Says DPRK Possesses 6 or 7 Nuclear Weapons

SK1603031993 Seoul HANGUK ILBO in Korean  
16 Mar 93 p 1

[Text] In the National Assembly Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee's closed-door hearings, Dr. Kim Tae-u, senior researcher at the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, said on 15 March: It is certain that North Korea possesses six or seven nuclear weapons at present. Since October 1986, North Korea has apparently extracted at least 14 to 15 kilograms of plutonium and may have up to 40 to 50 kilograms of plutonium.

## SOUTH KOREA

### No Economic Cooperation Until Nuclear Issue Resolved

*SK1503064093 Seoul YONHAP in English 0629 GMT  
15 Mar 93*

[Text] Seoul, March 15 (YONHAP)—President Kim Yong-sam said Monday that there could not be any economic cooperation between South and North Korea unless the North Korean nuclear issue was resolved.

The government would not allow any economic exchanges or visits by Southern businessmen to the North unless Pyongyang retracted its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or the North Korean nuclear question was settled, Kim said.

Kim made the remark after he received a report by National Unification Minister Han Wan-sang. Han's report was the first by a cabinet minister to the president since the administration was inaugurated Feb. 25.

"The Unification Board, and the Foreign, Defense and other concerned Ministries should cooperate to persuade our allies as well as Russia and China to pressure North Korea to retract its decision to leave the NPT," Kim told Han.

"The North Korean decision has become the target of international criticism," Kim said. "We too should take it seriously."

"But we do not wish North Korea to receive pain or be further isolated in the international community," Kim said.

On the issue of repatriation of Yi In-mo, a North Korean guerrilla fighter, Kim told Han to take steps to return Yi "immediately, even tomorrow (Tuesday) afternoon, should everything go well in tomorrow's inter-Korean liaison officials' contact."

"This is the right thing to do to comply with the principle of humanitarianism and righteous in the perspective of restoring confidence to inter-Korean relations," he said.

On the possibility of an inter-Korean summit, Kim said, "let there be no such incident that all South-North issues are centered solely on the aim of the summit.

"The summit should be realized naturally in the course of faithfully preparing national unification, and should we continue to do so, the summit can be realized during my tenure."

## MALAYSIA

### DPRK Urged To Reconsider Withdrawal From NPT

*BK1703072393 Kuala Lumpur BERNAMA in English  
0604 GMT 17 Mar 93*

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, March 17 (OANA/BERNAMA)—Malaysia Wednesday, expressed its regret over North Korea's decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The Malaysian Foreign Ministry (Wisma Putra) said in a statement here the decision would weaken international efforts to establish and maintain a truly universal nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The decision also carries serious implications for the overall stability of the Asia Pacific region and in particular the Korean peninsula, it added.

In the statement, Malaysia appealed to North Korea to reconsider its decision and continue to contribute towards the process of regional confidence building and the enhancement of international security.

Malaysia would also like to appeal to those countries who have not done so, to accede to the NPT so as to encourage and strengthen a global nuclear non-proliferation regime, it added.

## MONGOLIA

### Concern Over DPRK Withdrawal From NPT

*SK1703010393 Seoul YONHAP in English 0031 GMT  
17 Mar 93*

[Text] Moscow, March 16 (YONHAP)—Mongolia expressed regret and apprehension Monday at North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

A Mongolian Foreign Ministry statement said that conflicts in international relations should be solved through dialogue based on peace and in a manner that contributes to interests of the Pacific Region, including the Korean peninsula, and the world.

The ministry said that Mongolia supported efforts to strengthen the treaty.

**BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA****Report of 'Poisonous Gases' in Srebrenica Area Attacks**

*LD1303185793 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 13 Mar 93*

[Text] The most difficult situation is in Srebrenica and we have just received the latest report from this town:

[Unidentified correspondent] The aggressors' fierce offensive against Srebrenica has been raging for almost two months. Throughout today the aggressors launched heavy artillery and infantry attacks. At 1545 we received a report from Srebrenica that the aggressors' air force was engaged in combat action in the Kragivode area, while in the Biljeg area—the scene of the fiercest infantry battles—enemy helicopters are releasing poisonous gases.

The press center of the Srebrenica Armed Forces Headquarters reporting for Bosnia-Hercegovina Radio and Television.

**POLAND****Deep Unease Over DPRK Decision on NPT**

*LD1303191393 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1800 GMT 13 Mar 93*

[Text] Poland's minister of foreign affairs has issued a statement expressing its deep unease at the decision announced yesterday by the DPRK to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation pact. This is a step which could have serious and damaging consequences for security, both on a regional and a global scale. It threatens attempts at a peaceful regulation of litigious problems between the two Korean states.

## ARGENTINA

### CNEA Head Views Heavy Water Plant Costs, Exports

*PY1503185993 Buenos Aires Radio Nacional Network in Spanish 1600 GMT 15 Mar 93*

[Text] The president of the National Commission for Atomic Energy (CNEA) has downplayed criticism of the useful life of the Arroyito heavy water plant and its cost, which surpassed by 700 million pesos the original estimate.

CNEA President Manuel Mondino said that Argentine components have a useful life of 10 years and emphasized the possibility that arose during the last few days for exporting heavy water to Romania and the ROK.

## BRAZIL

### Production of Enriched Uranium to Increase

*PY1403222593 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 0104 GMT 13 Mar 93*

[Text] Rio de Janeiro, 12 March (AFP-NA)—Admiral Othon Luiz Pinheiro da Silva told GAZETA MERCANTIL newspaper that Brazil will expand its capability to produce enriched uranium by 29 percent this year.

Adm. Pinheiro da Silva, chairman of the Navy Ministry's Special Projects Coordinating Board (Copesp), reported that this increase will be achieved by installing 162 high-speed centrifuges, totally designed and manufactured in Brazil, in Navy laboratories.

The Navy Ministry is developing its nuclear program at the aforementioned laboratories. This program is concurrent with the one implemented by the Ministry of Mines, Energy, and Metallurgy to produce nuclear energy.

Adm. Pinheiro da Silva reported that approximately 565 high-speed centrifuges already have been installed at Copesp laboratories and their engineers have developed the technology to produce nuclear fuel all by themselves.

He stated that "our objective is to set up a pilot plant with approximately 8,000 high-speed centrifuges," and added that "because of a political decision" the enrichment of uranium will be limited to 20 percent.

According to GAZETA MERCANTIL, a confidential government report recently disclosed there are some 3,000 high-speed centrifuges in Brazil.

The aforementioned newspaper further reported that the [word indistinct] Navy Ministry [words indistinct] over the last few years resources amounting to \$56 million in the development of the technology to produce nuclear fuel, build a nuclear-powered submarine, and build nuclear reactors with an installed capacity of 11-600 MW [megawatts] to generate electrical energy.

The Navy Ministry currently is studying the possibility of building some storage facilities for nuclear fuel on an island off the Brazilian coast, the exact location of which has not been decided yet.

Brazil's national nuclear energy policy, which is being implemented within the framework of the agreement signed with the former FRG in June 1975, provides for the installation of eight nuclear power plants in Brazil with an installed capacity of 1,300 MW each and the technology transfer to produce and enrich uranium.

Angra-2, the first of the eight nuclear power plants planned in the aforementioned agreement, will become fully operational in 1997, according to what was made public by Marcelo Siqueira, chairman of Furnas Electric Power Plants, Inc. and in charge of operations at the Admiral Alvaro Alberto nuclear power plant, located 150 km from Rio de Janeiro.

Angra-3 is also part of the project, but construction work has been interrupted due to the serious financial straits the country is facing. Angra-1, which has a 626-MW, U.S.-made Westinghouse nuclear reactor, has been functioning erratically since it became fully operational in the 1980's.

### Othon on Expanded Uranium Enrichment Capability

*93WP0111Z Sao Paulo GAZETA MERCANTIL in Portuguese 12 Mar 93 pp 1, 5*

[Article by Jose Casado: "More Uranium Enrichment Capability"]

[Text] Sao Paulo—The government has decided to increase the country's installed capacity for uranium enrichment by 29 percent this year. That expansion will occur in laboratories belonging to the Navy, which operates the parallel nuclear program—or autonomous nuclear program, as the military prefer to call it.

The Navy's Special Projects Coordinating Board (Copesp) is going to set up 162 new enrichment ultracentrifuges designed, developed, and manufactured entirely in Brazil, according to Rear Admiral Othon Luiz Pinheiro da Silva, president of Copesp.

He says that 565 ultracentrifuges have already been installed in Copesp's laboratories in Sao Paulo. The system operates in the form of a "cascade": the level of uranium enrichment is directly related to the number of ultracentrifuges in operation.

The Navy has been insisting that it now has complete mastery of the technology for nuclear fuel production and that because of a political option, it does not intend to go beyond the 20-percent level in uranium enrichment (the higher the level of enrichment, the more suitable the material is for use in military devices).

"Our objective is to build a demonstration plant with about 8,000 ultracentrifuges," says Silva. The U.S. Government, which has exerted successive pressures to slow the nuclear program being operated by the military, indicates in a recent report that 3,000 ultracentrifuges have been installed in Brazil.

The Navy has spent \$565.9 million over the past 13 years to develop the technology for fuel production, design a nuclear-powered submarine, and build a reactor for small and medium-size nuclear power plants (from 11 to 600 megawatts).

Those three projects are interconnected and are being carried out by Copesp with a budget totaling \$76 million for this year. Similar expenditures will be made by the Institute for Nuclear and Energy Research (IPEN), which is located next to Copesp headquarters at the University of Sao Paulo (USP).

That is only part of the public money being spent on the parallel nuclear program, which is being carried out in laboratories controlled by the National Nuclear Energy Commission and is linked to the Strategic Affairs Secretariat in the Office of the Presidency of the Republic.

The official program at the Angra dos Reis plant has already cost about \$10 billion, according to estimates by the government itself. That plant spends more time shut down than it does operating. For example, in the blackout that left Rio de Janeiro and part of Espirito Santo without electricity on Wednesday, Angra I could not be started up; it was down for "maintenance."

Stored equipment and financial costs in connection with Angra II add up to \$100 million annually, according to official data.

Poor management and scant results have been a constant in the Brazilian nuclear program. Researchers at Unicamp [Campinas State University] estimate that for

every dollar obtained as a result of nuclear research in our country, another \$100 have been spent—a ratio averaging 10 times as much as that in other countries.

Silva, who is coordinator of one of the main research programs controlled by the military, argues: "We spend very little on nuclear research in Brazil compared to what would be desirable. In the Navy, the priority is efficiency with economy. I feel that in other areas, there really has been bad management."

There is evidence now that President Itamar Franco has given in to pressure to give new financial impetus to the main scientific and reequipment projects of the Armed Forces. Some of those projects are crucially dependent upon an expansion of our installed capacity for uranium enrichment.

The Navy, for example, is going to set up a new laboratory for the characterization of materials in Sao Paulo in June and is planning another unit for the study of hydrodynamics at the start of next year. It is also beginning to design a storage facility for nuclear fuel.

Those studies have not yet started. But it has already been decided that the storage facility will be set up on an island in the ocean and that it will be capable of storing nuclear fuel for up to 50 years.

The Air Force has just received authorization to go ahead with its project for a subsonic fighter plane (see the separate article [not included here]) and to speed up research in connection with its Satellite Launch Vehicle (VLS), which is an essential part of its ballistic missile program. It is receiving funds to expedite construction of a sophisticated satellite in partnership with China after spending \$12 million in January on a contract with a U.S. firm to launch its first satellite, which is much simpler from the technological standpoint.

## EGYPT

### Argentine Ambassador Discusses Nuclear Cooperation

93WP0070A Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic  
14 Dec 92 p 55

[Text] Jorge Humberto de Belaustegui, the Argentine ambassador to Egypt, said in an exclusive statement to ROSE AL-YUSUF that Egypt will not need the assistance of his country in the near future because it will have its own technology in the field of isotope production.

It will be able to transfer this technology to the countries in the region, especially since it has bought a nuclear reactor from Argentina.

The ambassador, commenting on an article published by ROSE AL-YUSUF titled *When the Reactor Explodes*, said that Argentina will train and qualify Egyptian experts in the field of nuclear technology and that Egypt will participate with the Argentine Government and with Argentine companies in building the reactor.

The ambassador said that the views about nuclear accidents that were expressed in the article are not acceptable because Argentina started developing nuclear technology more than 30 years ago and is considered one of the leading countries in this field.

He said: "After four years of in-depth studies by the Egyptian National Committee for Nuclear Energy, the contract was awarded to the Argentine company, despite the fact that other companies from the United States, Germany, France, and Canada have entered the bidding. The basic condition for bidding was experience, which the Argentine company proved through its many projects both inside and outside of Argentina."

It is worth mentioning that this reactor will be built under the supervision of the International Agency for Atomic Energy and in compliance with its regulations.

## INDIA

### U.S. Stand on BJP Nuclear Policy Viewed

BK1503134793 Bombay NAVBHARAT TIMES  
in Hindi 5 Mar 93 p 4

[Editorial: "Bharatiya Janata Party, Nuclear Bomb, and America"]

[Text] Two statements made before the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Congress could be of significance for India. The statements came from two experts who had actively contributed to preparing the draft of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] and that is why their statements cannot be dismissed as pure academic importance. The experts are Leonard Spector and (Michael Krepon). Both have expressed the view that if the Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] came to power in India, a nuclear arms race will begin in South Asia.

Describing the BJP as a Hindu nationalist party, both suspect that it will manufacture nuclear weapons according to its declared manifesto, and then it will be difficult to restrain Pakistan. Both experts see a strong possibility for the BJP coming to power, a consequence of which nuclear nonproliferation will suffer a setback in South Asia.

But we are not ready to accept that the United States will be able to influence this extremely internal issue of India's political sovereignty through these two leading personalities or their voice. India is not a rolling stone which can be turned in whatever direction by whoever and whenever. After all, it was India's courage that, in spite of years of international pressure, no central government agreed to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and now the affluent nations have been forced to think about easing this pressure. No party in India should also be under the illusion that it has found a new weapon against the BJP. The BJP should also not make it a bargaining chip because if the United States does not like the BJP, it does not like the Janata Dal or the Communist Party of India-Marxist as well. The matter is a different nature. The fact is that the United States likes its national interests the most and its experts and leaders make long-term and well thought out preparations to protect them. The two aforementioned experts also told the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Congress that the Indian missile program should be stopped. Otherwise, they fear it will be difficult to stop Pakistan and both countries will gradually attain the capability of inter-continental ballistic missiles. That is why restraint is necessary and if straightforward diplomacy fails, there should be no hesitancy to use means such as economic assistance, bilateral trade, and multipurpose credits.

So, the first message is that a psychology is being built up in the United States that once again equates India and Pakistan, as hinted in the CIA director's statement last week. The second message is that the United States will not stop only at oral commitments on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The third message is that the United States is carrying out an in-depth study of the political turmoil in India. The question is whether we in India are aware of all this?

### Concern Over Chinese Arms Supplies to Pakistan, Burma

BK1603130793 Delhi THE HINDUSTAN TIMES  
in English 10 Mar 93 p 12

[By M.K. Dhar]

[Text] NEW DELHI, March 9—Reports about huge arms transfers by China to Myanmar [Burma] and Pakistan, including medium range missiles and aircraft, are causing concern among official circles which fear hardening of the attitude of these two countries towards neighbours.

Even though Beijing has agreed to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines it has not stopped sales of missiles to various countries. In Pakistan's case, it is assisting in the production of the 400 km range HATF-2 surface-to-surface missile which, when further developed, could carry nuclear warheads. Recently it supplied at least a dozen M-11 missiles to Pakistan, ignoring U.S. warnings.

Official circles feel that further arming of Pakistan will only increase its hostility towards India and augment its capacity to supply weapons on a large-scale to terrorists operating inside Jammu and Kashmir and those under training in camps across the Line of Control. China has emerged as the third largest exporter of arms to developing countries supplying to the tune of U.S. \$2.6 billion last year.

China has entered into a U.S. \$1.4 billion arms deal with Myanmar which includes radar, anti-aircraft guns, 25 F-6 and F-7 jet fighters, 100 tanks, 150 air-to-air missiles and patrol boats. China is also making its presence felt in the Indian Ocean through Myanmar ports and is building a naval base in the Irrawaddy Delta at Hangyi island and upgrading the one on great Cucus island, very close to the Andaman islands, which has a radar station and a power telescope. The strength of its armed forces, which in the eighties was about 1,90,000, [as published] is reported to have touched 3,00,000 [as published] this year with plans to take it to 5,00,000 [as published] by 1995.

India's political relations with Myanmar have remained frozen particularly after the house-arrest of the Nobel peace-prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi and New Delhi's condemnation of certain actions of the Army's State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). Border trade between the two countries also remains suspended. A dialogue at the level of foreign secretaries last year was largely unproductive because of India's strong stand on the issue of Suu Kyi's release and installation of a popular civilian Government. No fresh dialogue is planned in the near future though some overtures have been made. The new Indian Ambassador, Mr. G. Parthasarathy, who was here recently for consultations has received indications that Myanmar is interested in improving its relations with India.

China and Thailand are maintaining excellent economic relations with Rangoon. Many Chinese advisers are stated to be working in Myanmar, at some of the ports and also construction sites close to the Indian border. Beijing's arms sales and its physical presence in Myanmar could upset the strategic balance in the region, according to diplomatic observers. Agreements on border trade and on terrorism and drug trafficking are currently under negotiation.

Apart from transfer of conventional weapons, it is export of nuclear technology by China to Pakistan which has caused widespread concern.

U.S. intelligence assessment is that China's arms sales are driven by economic, political as well as strategic considerations. Beijing's arms transfers to Pakistan have

generally been made at "friendship prices", suggesting minimal economic motives. With U.S. military assistance to Pakistan having been withheld, China continues to be its main arms supplier.

The controversial aspect of Beijing's military transfers to Islamabad involves non-conventional weaponry. China has reportedly supplied it uranium for enrichment, confirmed its designs for nuclear devices and perhaps allowed it to test a nuclear device in China's Lop Nur desert, although it is claimed that Pakistan's nuclear devices being enriched uranium based do not need testing.

Over the years China's arms supplies to Pakistan include 1500 T-59 and T-60 tanks, 350 fighter aircraft including F-6, F-8 and Q-5, 30 naval vessels including 2 Romeo Class submarines and short to intermediate-range missiles including M-11, capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Beijing has also helped Islamabad develop aircraft refitting factories for the overhaul of the fighter aircraft and is working on joint production of Karakoram-8 trainer. Indigenous capacity to produce a new version of T-69 tank with a 105-mm gun and laser range finder and computerised fire-control system is also being built. Annual production is expected to be in the range of 150 to 200 upgraded tanks a year. Help is also available for producing a Chinese-designed surface-to-air missile, similar to Stinger and also Red-arrow-8 anti-tank missiles. China has also agreed to supply a 300 mw nuclear reactor and reportedly discussed the possibility of supplying a nuclear-powered submarine.

As regards Iran, China has permitted licensed production of surface-to-surface missiles. The possibility of Chinese-designed arms being supplied by Pakistan to it is also not ruled out. Even though China has proclaimed many times over that it does not supply weapons to aggravate tensions or to countries at war, during the Iran-Iraq war as many as 150 F-6 and F-7 fighter aircraft, nearly 700 tanks, 300 APC [armored personnel carriers] and 1600 pieces of artillery and thousands of anti-tank missiles and SAMs [surface to air missiles] were sold to Tehran.

China is now reportedly modernising its own defence equipment and acquiring Su-27 and MiG 31 jets as well as ground defences and sophisticated radar systems. Even though its attention is now devoted mainly to economic developments, modernisation and expansion of its armed forces—it already has the world's largest army—is not being ignored. All these developments are causing worry to Indian policy planners due to the possibility of the security environment in South Asia deteriorating further.

**Defense Scientist on Success of Phased Array Radar**  
*BK1603114393 Delhi PATRIOT in English 2 Mar 93*  
*p 6*

[Text] Indian scientists have achieved a major success by developing the phased array radar, critical for its

"Akash" surface-to-air missile, according to the scientific advisor to Defence Minister, Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, reports PTI.

This radar, which the West is not willing to sell to India, can track over 100 targets at a time. This critical component in India's Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) has been developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), Dr. Kalam, who is also heading the DRDO, said.

The Defence Ministry has identified several critical areas for future development as its peaceful missile development programme has been viewed with suspicion in the West, he told reporters here yesterday.

Dr. Kalam, regarded as the brain behind India's successful missile programmes said the US decision to impose a ban on the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and continued threat of a complete ban under the Missile Control Technology Regime (MTCR) has given a fillip to India's missile programme.

Criticising the West for overreacting to India's indigenous missile development programmes, Dr. Kalam said, science and technology has progressed so fast that even if the West wanted to curb India's missile programmes, they will not succeed.

He said the multinational defence manufacturers with the help of foreign media was "constantly bombarding us with false propaganda" on India's defence research programmes. Further, he said "the West also had an ulterior motive behind such moves as they want their defence equipment production units to run three shifts."

Dr. Kalam said the "Prithvi" surface-to-surface battlefield tactical missile designed for the Indian Army was almost ready for production while the Air Force version needs some more test firing.

He said all the three versions of the "Trishul" surface-to-air missile were at an advanced stage of development. Especially, the naval version with sea-skimming ability is a "real success," he claimed.

The indigenous Pilotless Target Aircraft (PTA) "Lakshya," which the three services wanted to induct for battlefield surveillance as a force multiplier was also getting ready, he said.

The Indian media should project the true image of Indian defence programmes and "we should believe in our capability and celebrate even a small invention" which Dr. Kalam said will encourage the hardworking Indian scientists.

## ISRAEL

### Deputy Foreign Minister Ties UN Grouping to Chemical Weapons Treaty

TA1503123393 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 15 Mar 93 p 1

[Report by Hemi Shalev]

[Text] Israel has informed the United Kingdom that its noninclusion in any geographical group in the United Nations may impair its ability to comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention, signed several months ago in Paris, and might also influence its readiness to sign the convention prohibiting the proliferation or stockpiling of biological weapons.

Deputy Foreign Minister Yosi Beilin told Douglas Hurd, the British minister for foreign and Commonwealth affairs, that Jerusalem is extremely disappointed with Europe's growing inclination to reject Israel's request to join the geographical group of "Western Europe and Others" (WEO) within the UN framework. Ever since the establishment of the State of Israel, the Arab states have prevented it from joining the Asian geographical group, while the EC countries, led by Britain, plan to reject Israel's request to be accepted in the WEO.

The geographical groupings permit the election of different countries to various UN frameworks, such as the Security Council. Beilin told Hurd that Israel's noninclusion in any geographic group prevents it from joining the institutions now being established in Prague by the Chemical Weapons Convention. For the same reason, in the future Israel will not be able to join the organizations now being set up by the treaty on the nonproliferation of biological weapons. Beilin implied that this situation will require Israel's "perusal."

In his talks in London, Beilin managed to secure initial British agreement to cooperate in the field of international aid allocated by Israel through the Foreign Ministry's Department of International Cooperation. It was agreed that Israel and Britain will begin such cooperation, which is already maintained with several countries, including the United States and the Netherlands. The British expressed readiness to cooperate on aid to the CIS, Central Africa, and the Black leadership in South Africa belonging to the African National Congress.

Beilin also sought British support for Israel's request for "favored status" in its economic relations with Europe, prior to the Council of Europe's decision regarding the "mandate" that will be given to the officials negotiating with Israel on this matter. Israel and the EC are now conducting "exploratory talks" prior to the decision on the negotiating mandate, which is expected this summer.

**LIBYA****European Firms Build Poison Gas Factory**

AU1603155293 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER  
ALLGEMEINE in German 16 Mar 93 p 7

[Udo Ulfkotte report: "European Companies Help Libya Build Another Poison Gas Factory"]

[Text] Frankfurt, 15 March—Several companies from Switzerland, Japan, Italy, Denmark, Austria, Great Britain, France, and Poland are under suspicion of illegally helping Libya build a new poison gas factory—one of the largest in the Third World. On the other hand, the investigation proceedings on a German engineer in Luenen will be discontinued by the public prosecutors in Bochum before the end of this month. Less than a month ago, the Federal Government noted with annoyance that U.S. State Department spokesman Snyder publicly accused three German companies of having supplied component parts for the construction of a new Libyan poison gas factory. It is true that Snyder added that companies from other countries were also involved in the project, but—unlike in the case of the German firms—he declined to give their names, so as not to discredit them.

Despite the sanctions that the United Nations imposed against Libya on 15 April last year, Libyan revolution leader Al-Qadhdhafi apparently has no problems in procuring the components for the construction of another poison gas factory abroad. This second chemical weapons factory will be of the same type as the poison gas factory in Al-Rabitah. Since the middle of last year, there has been a lot of activity on the building site in the village Ras Fam Mullaghah near the town of Tarhuna, 65 kilometers southeast of Tripoli. According to Western security circles, on the edge of chalky sandstone mountains, two parallel underground tunnel systems roughly 150 meters long have allegedly been completed, in which facilities for the production of poison gas will be installed. Above these tunnels, there are two 500-meter long construction sites that are not airfields, according to satellite monitors. U.S., French, Russian, and Chinese satellites have made numerous photos of the terrain near Tarhuna in recent weeks. At the international chemical weapons conference in Paris in January, Libya refused to sign a UN convention banning conventional weapons.

According to Western security circles, the poison gas factory near Tarhuna will not start production before 1995. The Libyans claim that the tunnels form part of the "great river," a 25 billion-dollar prestige project of Al-Qadhdhafi for the artificial irrigation of the coastal region with ground water from the Sahara. In this mammoth project, which Al-Qadhdhafi has praised as the "eighth wonder of the world," ground water from the Sahara will be taken to the coast through two water pipelines that together are 1,900 kilometers long. Part of this project in the east of the country has already been completed, whereas the construction of the western

pipeline—not far from Tarhuna—will not be begun before the middle of this year.

**Ventilation Technology From Switzerland**

The know-how for the construction of the tunnels of the new water pipeline will be supplied by the Salzburg-based engineering firm Sauer, which will get the commission one of these days. However, the owner of this firm said that until last Thursday [11 March], he did not know that the Libyans had also used his planning documents and his know-how, which he had submitted to Tripoli, for the construction of the tunnel systems for the new poison gas factory. Sauer told this newspaper: "My developments in tunnel construction are publicly accessible and are contained in many relevant publications." Therefore, he could not prevent them from being used for the construction of military facilities, he said. However, two Swiss firms have apparently been ready to cooperate directly with Libya. According to U.S. security circles, the expensive separate air admission and air discharge systems of the tunnels in Tarhuna should also have given the Swiss engineers a "clear" indication that a chemical facility was being built. Security circles claim that besides the ventilation system, another Swiss company that has close relations with the Bank of Credit and Commerce (BCCI), which broke down following several scandals, supplied "decontamination products," safety systems and highly sophisticated alarm systems to Libya through a business partner in Asia.

As in the case of the first Libyan poison gas factory in Al-Rabitah, most components for setting up the facility were, however, largely supplied through four firms in Thailand and two sham addresses in Singapore and Hong Kong. The firm W & M Limited in Chiang Mai, Thailand, also dragged a German company into the construction of the new poison gas factory—without the latter's knowledge. The Luenen-based Westfalia-Becorit Industrietechnik GmbH [Industrial Engineering Limited] supplied two tunnel cutting machines to Libya through W & M Limited, which are now being used for the construction of the tunnels for the poison gas factory. This case demonstrates the covert way in which the Libyans proceed in their attempt to obtain Western high technology for military projects.

On 18 May 1990, W & M Limited contacted Westfalia-Becorit by telex for the first time, requesting a bid for the supply of partial cutting machines that are used in mining for underground tracks. Asked by the German company where and for what purpose the machines would be used, S. Wirote, the chief of the Thai company, said: "The machines will be used in Libya for the construction of road tunnels, width 9 meters, height 6 meters, three tunnels with individual lengths of 200-300 meters. It is sandstone with plaster intercalations, compression strength 50-80 Megapascal with quartz intercalations of less than 25 percent." Westfalia-Becorit executive Conrad told this newspaper: "These profiles presented by the Thais are the usual dimensions for two-lane road construction; therefore, there is no reason

to be suspicious." The contract for a partial cutting machine of the WAV-170 type of a total order value of approximately 2 million German marks [DM] was signed on 19 September 1990. In August 1991, the German company, which was founded in 1826, also supplied a cutting loader of the Luchs-H type for DM1.5 million through the Thai firm, which had meanwhile become its business partner for Asia and Libya. With such a cutting loader, tunnels 7.20 meters high and up to 6.70 meters wide can be cut out of the rock. The customs documents for both shipments, which were not prohibited under German law, duly gave Libya as the destination. The Thais were responsible for putting the facility into operation and for taking over the service. The German customs authorities became suspicious in connection with a shipment of replacement parts last year. Since then, the public prosecutors in Bochum have investigated the company, which was suspected of having violated the Foreign Trade and Payments Law, because the products supplied could be used not only for civilian, but also for military purposes. The investigating prosecutor, Bieniossek, told this newspaper: "According to the information we have obtained, there are no indications that the responsible people in the firm knew the real purpose for which the machines were to be used. On this basis, we intend to drop the proceedings."

Since August last year, the Libyan Government has tried, through sham firms abroad, to win over Westfalia-Becorit for supplying replacement parts. On 19 November last year, the firm Maral, which is based in La Valetta, Malta, ordered replacement parts from Westfalia-Becorit in Luenen by telex—without success. The management in Luenen believes that the Libyans were behind this order. However, since then, Westfalia-Becorit has stopped supplying machinery without a written statement that its machines are not used for military purposes. W & M, which is headed by Thai manager Wirote, and in which geologist Apiwon is another leading executive, has continued efforts to buy another tunnel cutting machine built by Westfalia-Becorit, because according to security circles, the Libyans want to accelerate the construction of the new poison gas facility.

#### Ventilating Fans From Germany

Even though the public prosecutors will not carry out investigations in this case, the United States has mentioned the names of two other German companies in connection with the construction of the new poison gas factory in Libya. The Essen-based firm Turbofilter GmbH supplied a dedusting machine for the tunnel cutting machine built by Westfalia-Becorit at a price of DM180,000; in the same connection, the firm Korfmann in Witten, which has been an important supplier in the mining sector for more than 100 years, twice supplied two ventilating fans for DM100,000 each. In connection with the second poison gas factory, the public prosecutors believe that—unlike many other European firms—no German company knew that its products were intended for the construction of another poison gas factory. The management of the Association of

the German Engineering Industry in Frankfurt, representing about 3,000 German engineers, states: "Many German firms are seeing export control problems in connection with Libya. German companies are trying, in particular after Al-Rabitah, not to get involved in critical projects." Nonetheless, the help given unknowingly by Westfalia-Becorit will have consequences. According to information obtained by this newspaper, the Federal Government intends, before the end of this month, to include in the export list machines to create underground cavities that are intended for Libya. Such machines would then be subject to approval, irrespective of their purpose. In that case, not even dredgers can be supplied to Libya—something that is permitted in all other European countries.

#### Monthly Salary of DM15,000

The first Libyan poison gas factory in Al-Rabitah, which was built with the help of German companies, was partly destroyed by fire in March 1990. Washington claimed that the fire was an "attempt by the Libyans to cover something up." According to U.S. intelligence information, more than 100 tonnes of the nerve gas Sarin and other chemical agents have meanwhile been produced in the Al-Rabitah facility, which was reestablished; they are put into grenades and warheads. Libya claims, however, that the facility in Al-Rabitah is a pharmaceutical factory. Under the management of a British expert, several dozen engineers from Denmark, Austria, Italy, and Poland allegedly work in the Al-Rabitah factory. The British weekly THE SUNDAY TIMES published last year the names of the engineers working there; apart from gifts—such as vehicles—they get a monthly salary of about DM15,000 net. Three former executives of the Imhausen chemical company in Lahr had been sentenced to prison terms of between 12 and 20 months because they were involved in planning and building the Al-Rabitah poison gas factory in the years 1984 to 1988 and had thereby violated the Foreign Trade and Payments Law.

### PAKISTAN

#### Editorial Sympathizes With DPRK Withdrawing From NPT

BK1603103793 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
16 Mar 93 p 6

[Editorial: "The Basic Flaw in Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty"]

[Text] It is not difficult to understand North Korea's consternation over the insistence of the United States and the western world in general to subject in nuclear establishments and facilities to international inspection. North Korea insists that its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes and with no aggressive intentions towards anyone. The nuclear facilities such as it possesses or plans to develop pose no threat to any state.

There is also considerable weight in Pyongyang's contention that international inspection is little short of blackmail. In the first place it compromises an independent country's sovereignty.

Besides, where is the guarantee that on not being able to find anything objectionable at two sites or three, the international inspectors so-called would not demand to probe other sites, facilities and projects. Once permitted to visit one or two projects, the doors would be opened to endless interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state. There can be no valid reason for forcing what is plainly interference on a sovereign state.

The real trouble with the international inspection is that it is blatantly selective. For instance Israel has been given a free rein in the field of development of nuclear weapons of terrific destructive power. The whole world is fully aware that Israel is a full fledged nuclear power. It is also common knowledge that the United States and some of its close allies have actively helped Israel continue to refine its nuclear capability and there is no check on it. The United States continues to extend every possible help to Israel. But no Arab state is permitted to even think of entering the nuclear field. The one which tried has been systematically destroyed and continues to be the target of the fiercest military and diplomatic assaults including a blanket United Nations boycott and

blockade. India, too, has been given a long leash as far as its proven nuclear capability is concerned. India exploded a nuclear device as long ago as 1974 and has since acquired nuclear weapons. Some western intelligence sources say India could have anything up to 200 nuclear bombs. India has also the capability to deliver these bombs with the help of its Agni missiles. On the other hand Pakistan is under tremendous pressure over its nuclear research programmes which the government has repeatedly declared are entirely peaceful in nature.

The theory is that Pakistan, or for that matter any other country in a situation similar to Pakistan's, should be forced to freeze its nuclear research just where it is. This means that if the freeze formula was to be accepted India would retain its nuclear arsenal as well as its delivery systems while Pakistan will have nothing comparable. How can anyone accept such a manifestly loaded formula against its security and sovereign independence? If justice is to be done then all states should be treated with even-handed dispensation. So far the United States has tended to be arbitrary in its nuclear non-proliferation policies and no self-respecting nation can submit to such policies. North Korea's decision to opt out of the NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty] charade is understandable particularly when it is known that South Korea has the support of U.S. nuclear forces in the region.

## RUSSIA

### Red Mercury Exports Said Used As Cover for Plutonium Trade

PM1603165393 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian 13 Mar 93 First Edition p 2

[Igor Andreyev report: "More About the Phantom Going by the Name of 'Red Mercury'"]

[Text] You would think the repeated statements in the press from leading scientific authorities that there is and can be no such thing in nature as "red mercury" ought to have laid this phantom to rest. But no—from the ranks of scientific phenomena, it has turned into a means of political struggle, and from the platform of the extraordinary Congress Deputy Sayenko has accused the authorities and Russian exporters of allegedly supplying the West with this highly valuable preparation.

Doctor of Chemical Sciences Boris Chayvanov, director of the "Kurchatov Institute" Russian Scientific Center Institute of Applied Chemical Physics, says: "I reiterate for the umpteenth time that no such object physically exists. Judging from the certificates for the manufacture of 'red mercury' which my fellow chemists and I have seen, it is impossible to make it. But here is what is typical of the talks about this—some have been held at our institute, for instance. It is not technical specialists who participate on the foreign side, but businessmen

representing certain brokerage firms. They show contracts for the delivery of 'red mercury' and bank guarantees for the payment of million-dollar sums. And we say: Fine, we'll make the stuff. But it would be nice to clarify scientific and technical details with experts. They reply: This is a subject for the next round of talks. And they disappear. Forever.

"I am convinced that 'red mercury' is an invented chemical phenomenon designed, via the extremely high cost of the preparation, to screen some purely financial machinations or genuine underground trade in fissionable—radioactive—materials. Plutonium, for instance, for military needs.

"In the first instance the side pledging to deliver 'red mercury' abroad naturally fails to honor this commitment. And it pays its partner an enormous penalty sum, legally transferring huge sums of currency abroad, which of course is precisely the aim of the operation. In the second instance, under the guise of a harmless substance, real plutonium is exported. Officially, customs officers have no grounds to complain about the exported goods.

"Some samples of 'red mercury' have come into our possession here at the institute," B. Chayvanov concluded. "In one instance, it was normal mercury, and, what is more, it was dirty. In a second instance, it was a lead bar encased in a stainless steel container..."

*IZVESTIYA* was told at the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations that so-called "red mercury" has never been included in the lists of goods exported from the country, and no deals have been or are being concluded on this score.

**GERMANY****Subs May Be Sold to Taiwan Through ROK, United States**

*OW1403025593 Beijing XINHUA in English  
0131 GMT 14 Mar 93*

[Text] Bonn, March 13 (XINHUA)—German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel stated at a party meeting today that he was against any export of submarines to Taiwan.

Addressing a congress session of the Free Democratic Party in the state of Bremen, Kinkel said selling arms to Taiwan would seriously harm Germany's relations with China and go against German Government's consistent principle of not exporting arms to regions where the situation is in tension.

German ship-builders have demanded the export of their submarines to Taiwan. Their demand was refused by the federal security council on January 28.

However, the German News Agency DPA, quoting the latest issue of the "FOCUS" weekly, reported today that there is a plan of exporting submarines to Taiwan through a "round way".

Under the plan, German submarines would be stripped and shipped to the United States and South Korea where they would be reassembled before provided to Taiwan.

The weekly revealed that German ship-builders would go to the United States to discuss the business.

**British Man Accused of Attempting To Sell Russian Plutonium**

*LD1503190393 Berlin DDP in German 1820 GMT  
15 Mar 93*

[Text] Flensburg (DDP)—In the spectacular case of an attempted sale of plutonium, the State Prosecutor's Office in Flensburg has brought charges against a 51-year-old man from Flensburg. The man is accused of violating the war weapons control law and of illegal handling of nuclear fuels, the State Prosecutor's Office announced today. The explosives expert from Flensburg, who holds a British passport, is accused of having last year planned to sell 80 kg of Russian plutonium suitable for making weapons, probably to Iraq, for 80 million German marks.

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